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Introduction 
1.1.0. Background 
This study is carried out against the background of certain truisms: that 
efficient transport, reliable energy, safe drinking water and modern 
telecommunication systems are critical to attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI), expanding international trade and achieving long-term 
investment and growth.1 Developing countries and in particular sub-
Saharan Africa have continued to maintain poor infrastructure, which 
results in, inadequate trade and transport facilitation systems that 
continually penalise these countries with regard to their participation in 
and expansion of international trade.2
 
Similarly, Africa has continued to lose out to other regions of the world 
with regard to its attractiveness as a destination for FDI. The latest World 
Bank statistics show that Africa commands a meagre 2.6 percent of the 
total inward stock of FDI.3 In this Report the developed countries are 
shown to command over 70 percent of inward FDI, while the developing 
countries command slightly under 30 percent of inward FDI.4 This shows 
                                                 
1  M Dailami et al., ‘The challenges of financing infrastructure in developing countries’ in World Bank global 
development finance report (2004) 149. 
2  TR Lakshmanan ‘Transport and trade facilitation: An overview’ in TR Lakshmanan et al. (ed), Integration 
of transport and trade facilitation: selected regional case studies. p6 “…inadequate trade and transport 
facilitation systems… creates an efficiency penalty”. See also, African Development Bank, Globalization 
and Africa's Development, African Development Report, 2003 p14 “… In 2000, Africa's share of world 
export was only 2.7 percent and sub-Saharan Africa's share of export of goods fell from 1.9 to 1.4 percent 
during the 1990s”.  
3  World Bank, ‘FDI for developing and transition economies: implications for development’ in World 
investment report (2006). 
4  World Bank, World investment report  (2006) p7. 
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that Africa is not only losing out to the developed countries but also to 
the other developing countries that have put in place mechanisms that 
have seen those regions become attractive destinations for inward FDI.  
  
While the foregoing does not go a long way in explaining the great 
problems of the developing countries’ infrastructure, availability of 
infrastructure, particularly efficient transport services, is crucial for 
economic development; as transport services are essential for reaching 
world markets,5 strengthening global integration and attracting FDI.6 For 
instance, with globalisation there is a continuous shift of manufacturing 
industries to countries offering competitive advantage in transportation, 
since transport has become part of the production and distribution 
process to obtain a competitive advantage for manufactured goods.7 
Therefore, the central contribution of good infrastructure towards the 
development of a country cannot be gainsaid.   
 
It is thus acknowledged that infrastructure is essential in the 
development of a country with regard to improving its competitiveness for 
FDI, expanding international trade and achieving long-term investment 
and growth.8 It is therefore clear that infrastructure development in sub-
Saharan Africa holds the key to integration of the region in the world 
                                                 
5  ‘Nyachae plan to create 150,000 ministry jobs’ Daily Nation 15 March 2007 (online edition) 
http://www.nationmedia.com “… approximately 15 per cent of tea went to waste as it failed to reach the 
factory in time for processing during the wet season”. 
6  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Efficient transport and trade facilitation 
to improve participation by developing countries in international trade. Available on 
http//:www.unctad.org  (accessed on 03 February 2007). 
7  D Grimsey & MK Lewis Public private partnerships: The worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision 
and project finance (2004) p 26 “… transport investment can generate a relocation of industry and 
economic activity”. 
8   See M Dailami et al (n1). 
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economy, and therefore reduction of poverty in accordance with the 
millennium development goals (MDGs).9
 
Infrastructure per se is a wide term. While there would be a general 
consensus that tangible capital assets such as bridges, roads, streets 
and tunnels are infrastructure, others would cast the net much wider. A 
distinction is often made between ‘hard’ (physical) and ‘soft’ 
infrastructure.10 This study would not like to focus on infrastructure as 
such, but would like to keep the idea of roads at the back of the reader’s 
mind since certain aspects of the investment models are based on the 
improvement of the road network.  
1.1.1. Transport Networks and Trade Facilitation 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of trade facilitation, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) defines trade facilitation as,11
… the adoption of a comprehensive and integrated approach to 
simplifying and reducing the cost of international trade transaction, and 
ensuring that the relevant activities take place in an efficient, 
transparent and predictable manner based on internationally accepted 
norms and standards and best practices (own emphasis).   
 
This study emphases costs and efficiency because they are attributable 
to infrastructure, and secondly, because if transport costs contribute 
high proportion of the value of goods, it results in increased prices and 
                                                 
9   Goal number one; eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. <www.un.org/milleniumgoals/ > (accessed on 
15/10/2006). 
10  Argy it al., Infrastructure and economic development, in Committee for economic development for 
Australia (CEDA) information paper No 60, (1999). 
11  Commission on Customs and Trade Regulations, ‘ICC recommendations for a WTO agreement on trade 
facilitation’, available on http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/customs/id557/index.html (last accessed on 6 
march 2007); see also Ambassador Matthias Meyer, Switzerland, (Chairman’s Summary) International 
Ministerial Conference on Transit Transport Cooperation, Roundtable on Trade Facilitation Measures 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, Thursday, 28 August 2003 “… Trade facilitation is about providing an environment 
for trade and transport that reduces the cost of international trade transactions”. 
 3
undermines the competitiveness of exports in foreign markets. Overall 
high transport costs limit a country's participation in international trade. 
It is therefore not surprising that Africa in general, and sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular, has the highest transport cost rates in the world,12 
and also has the lowest share of international trade.13
 
Some of the factors that contribute to high transport costs in Africa 
include: (a) inadequate infrastructure networks; and (b) inefficient 
transport operations. 
Inadequate infrastructure networks 
Despite the recognition that infrastructure is important for development 
and the adoption of several initiatives by the African countries including 
the ambitious Trans African Highways (TAH) network14 conceived in the 
early 1970s, missing links still exist.15  
 
The missing links clearly illustrate not only the poor state of physical 
integration between African countries, but also shows a significant 
incapacitation of intra-African trade, because the physical condition of 
cross-border links generally affects traffic levels and the quality of 
transport services between countries. Improved land transport linkages 
                                                 
12  United nations economic commission for Africa (UNECA) 2004, "Assessing regional integration in Africa" 
in ARIA I, p54 “… transport costs are high in Africa in general and in landlocked African countries in 
particular - averaging 14% of the value of exports. Also UNCTAD shows that the freight cost as a 
percentage of total import value was 13 % for Africa in 2000”.  
13  Committee on regional cooperation and integration UNECA, (2005) Trade facilitation to promote intra-
Africa trade, available at http://www.uneca.org (last accessed on 6 march 2007). 
14  The TAH network is made up of 9 highway sections namely: Cairo-Dakar, Algiers-Lagos (Trans-Saharian 
Highway), Tripoli-Windhoek, Cairo-Gaborone (Trans-East African Highway), Dakar-N'Djamena (Trans-
Sahelien Highway), N'djamena-Djibouti, Lagos-Dakar (Trans-Coastal Highway), Lagos-Mombasa, and 
Beira-Lobito. 
15  An analysis of 103 cross-border TAH links (TAH sections leading to border posts) shows that 33 % are 
unpaved roads in various conditions - good, fair and poor, 16% are paved roads in poor condition and 
38% are paved roads in good or fair condition. 
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reduce transport costs, which in turn promote economic activity and 
cross-border trade. 
 
It is inordinate to assume that the African states have blatantly refused 
to implement, or to maintain, the various infrastructures within their 
domain. It is important to determine the major cause of the problem. The 
International Ministerial Conference on Transit Transport Cooperation16 
noted that the endeavour to have the developing countries’ infrastructure 
match that of the developed countries would require time and resources. 
It further suggested that partnerships with the foreign private sector 
might offer the possibility to improve these transport services. 
Inefficient transport operations  
Inefficiency of transport services is mainly an offshoot of inadequate 
infrastructure networks or poorly maintained networks. However, it may 
be manifested in several ways, including: high vehicle maintenance 
costs, poor market information, existence of transport cartels, poor 
knowledge of operating costs, poor operating practices, and poor routine 
maintenance, all of which lead to high vehicle operating costs and low 
vehicle utilisation.17  
 
Transport operators usually transfer the burden of high vehicle operating 
costs to consumers by raising fares. Similarly, operators increase fares to 
offset low revenues due to low vehicle utilisation.18
1.1.2. Investment in Infrastructure 
It is estimated that US$ 622 billion was invested in developing countries’ 
infrastructure from 1992 to 2003.19 Figure 1.020 below, shows the 
                                                 
16  See Ambassador Matthias Meyer (n11). 
17  See UNECA committee on regional cooperation and integration (n13). 
18  Ibid.  
19  See M Dailami et al (n1) p 149. 
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distribution of the investments in infrastructure during the same period; 
it signifies that sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind other developing 
regions in attracting investments in infrastructure, only getting a meagre 
4 percent of the total investment.  
Figure 1.0: Regional composition of international investment in 
infrastructure, 1992-2003 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 30%
Middle East and North 
Africa 7%
South Asia 5%
Sub-Saharan Africa 
4%
East Asia and Pacif ic 
35%
Europe and Central 
Asia 19%
 
The same study reveals that the sub-Saharan Africa region is in dire 
need of infrastructure with the least density of paved roads per square 
kilometre of land.21
 
All these revelations, and taking into consideration the central role 
infrastructure, particularly roads, would play in the development of the 
sub-Saharan Africa region, are indicative of bottlenecks in a healthy flow 
and mobilisation of capital from national and international markets to 
sub-Saharan countries’ infrastructure.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
20  Ibid.. 
21  See M Dailami et al (n1) p 154 “Africa has 0.08 km/sq. of paved road per km/sq of land”.  
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1.2.0. Statement of the Problem 
The traditional sources of funds, the International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), are not able to meet the huge capital demands of the developing 
countries as a whole for infrastructure.22 In addition, the conditions 
attached to the IFIs programmes are in most cases value reducing and 
work as limitations in accessing capital by the countries that need it the 
most.23  
 
On the other hand, global commercial capital markets, viewed from the 
perspective of their size, depth, sophistication and range of instruments, 
have the potential to fund all economically viable infrastructure projects 
in developing countries. The sub-Saharan African countries so far still 
experience bottlenecks in drawing from these global commercial capital 
markets. 
 
This study examines this enormous task of lack of access to capital by 
developing countries from the viewpoint of lack of adequate legal and 
institutional frameworks that would ease their access to global 
commercial capital markets.  
 
Though there are other ways of looking at the problem, including from an 
economic and social perspective, this study opts to look at the way 
policies, institutions and regulation affect investment in infrastructure.  
1.3.0. Scope of the Research 
The proposed study is very extensive, as developing countries need 
capital for virtually everything, ranging from health care, education, 
provision of basic social amenities, housing etc.  
                                                 
22  e.g. it is estimated that only 8% of the funds availed for infrastructure in developing countries came from 
official development assistance, See M Dailami et al (n1) p 154. 
23  Mosley, Paul et al Aid and Power- The World Bank & Policy-Based Lending Vol. 1(1991). 
 7
 The methods of raising capital proposed in the study are not peculiar to 
infrastructure. Raising money from the capital markets, and the public 
private partnerships (PPPs), can also be applied in other fields if 
government needs and policy are conducive thereto.  
 
The researcher proposes to limit the scope of the study to the interface 
between investment and infrastructure, narrowing it down to roads 
financing. It has well been demonstrated that infrastructure sits at the 
core of a country’s development. 
 
This study will keep referring to developing countries and sub-Saharan 
Africa, though this is a wide group. The study will draw upon 
international best practices, but where it needs to use an example, it will 
refer to a specific country. 
 
The study also draws upon other disciplines such as economics and 
finance. However, it will not engage those disciplines but will endeavour 
to highlight the interface between those disciplines and the study of law, 
limiting the scope to issues of domestic law and international law. 
1.4.0. Research Objective 
The objective of the research is to draw a relationship between legal and 
institutional frameworks in a country, and the competitiveness of that 
country as a destination for investment either as real investment or 
portfolio investment for infrastructure development. 
 
The study will therefore endeavour to show that some bottlenecks with 
regard to investment have a legal solution, while in certain instances the 
establishment of certain institutions, or ensuring the efficient functioning 
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of those institutions where they exist, is essential in enhancing investor 
confidence.  
 
The study explores the possibility of using law to achieve certain ends in 
the markets, which will be termed as: using of legal instruments as a tool 
for market engineering. In this examination the study takes recognised 
market norms from other disciplines and gives them legal efficacy. For 
instance, how the law affects liquidity and trading in government papers. 
 
With regard to institutional frameworks, some institutions are a 
prerequisite to some market functions, e.g. a securities exchange is 
essential for the development of a secondary market for government 
papers.  Similarly, a strong institutional framework for protecting 
creditors’ rights, effective covenants, and reliable avenues of legal 
enforcement and remedies would enhance confidence amongst investors. 
These would to a great extent reduce risk for investors, and subsequently 
lower the cost of capital.  
1.5.0. Significance of the Study 
Undertaking the study is important for two reasons. First, it brings forth 
the issue of trade facilitation from a viewpoint that is more pressing and 
relevant to African countries. Indeed, it is increasingly being realised that 
tariffs, quotas and other trade policies are only one element of the overall 
cost of trade, and that efforts to improve customs procedures, minimize 
the trade distorting impact of standards, and reduce transport costs, may 
have a higher payoff than reciprocal reductions in overt trade policy 
barriers, because logistical, institutional and regulatory barriers are often 
more costly and generate no offsetting revenue (own emphasis).24  
 
                                                 
24  World Bank, Global economic prospects: Trade regionalism and development, (2005) p37. 
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Secondly, the need to increase investment in African countries is really 
pressing. As has already been illustrated, Africa fares badly with regard 
to its competitiveness as a destination for inward FDI, as well as with 
regard to the density of paved road coverage.25 The study highlights a 
possible relationship between investment and infrastructure 
development. Though there are arguments to the effect that 
infrastructure develops after investments,26 the most compelling view in 
the competitive world is that good infrastructure attracts investment. 
1.6.0. Hypotheses 
The study is based on three hypotheses: one, that good legal and 
institutional frameworks within a country boost a country’s 
competitiveness as a destination for investment; two, good legal and 
institutional frameworks within a country increase predictability, reduce 
investors’ risks and subsequently reduce the cost of capital; three, 
availability of capital to a country is proportional to the amount invested 
on infrastructure, that is, the more money at the disposal of a country, 
the more is spent on improving infrastructure. 
1.7.0. Literature Review 
This study does not pretend to pioneer research in the area of financing 
government projects. Neither does it claim to be the first on private 
capital participation in public projects. The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, (IMF),27 RW Ngugi et al.,28 and A 
Harwood,29 have undertaken extensive research on how to develop 
capital markets. Their research were very informative in carrying out this 
                                                 
25  See M Dailami et al (n1) p 154. 
26  See UNCTAD (n6). 
27  The World Bank & The IMF, Developing  government bond markets: A Handbook (2001). 
28  RW Ngugi et al., ‘Stock market development : what have we learned?’, in RW Ngugi et al (ed) Finance and 
development (2004). 
29  A Harwood (ed) Building local bond markets: An Asian perspective(2000). 
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study. T Endo30 carried the research further to issues of developing 
market infrastructure for secondary markets for government bonds. The 
World Bank and IMF31 further enrich the study with regard to issues of 
regulating financial systems and financial markets. 
 
M Klein,32 RG Gelos et al.,33 DA Grigorian34 the World Bank35 and P 
Rigby et al.,36 have researched on risk managements and determinants 
of risk, and the effects of risk on the cost of capital.  
 
H Kalsi and K Barnes37 write about contemporary issues with regard to 
private debt finance or participation of private capital in public projects. 
D Grimsey and MK LewisPublic38 pursue research on public private 
partnerships (PPPs) and detail the history and development of the PPPs 
to the present time.  
 
However, though the study heavily relies on other researchers’ findings, 
it can be distinguished therefrom, and seeks to apply them to solve some 
problems that are pressing in the developing countries with regard to 
access to capital. 
                                                 
30  Unpublished: T Endo ‘Developing efficient market infrastructure and secondary market of government 
bonds in developing countries’ unpublished paper presented in the 5th regional workshop on Developing 
Government Bond Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa (2003) 
31  The World Bank & The IMF, ‘Assessing the Legal Infrastructure for Financial Systems’ in Financial sector 
assessment: A handbook, (2005) 223 
32  M Klein, ‘Risk, taxpayers, and the role of government in project finance’, World Bank policy research 
working paper (1996). 
33  RG Gelos et al., ‘Sovereign borrowing by developing countries: What determines market access? IMF 
working paper WP/04/221. 
34  DA Grigorian, ‘On the determinants of first time sovereign bond issues’, IMF working paper WP/03/184. 
35  World Bank report, Private capital flows to developing countries, the road to financial integration (1997). 
36  P Rigby et al., ‘Criteria’, Standard & Poor’s criteria for debt rating (2001). 
37  H kalsi & K Barnes ‘‘Private debt finance for developing countries’ in World Bank, Global development 
finance: Harnessing cyclical gains for development (2004) 37. 
38  D Grimsey & MK Lewis Public private partnerships: The worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision 
and project finance (2004). 
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 In addition, the area of research is not very much explored, and most of 
the available works relate to the developed countries and the big 
developing countries; therefore they are oblivious of the needs of some 
small developing and least developed countries (LDCs).  
1.8.0. Methodology 
The approach of the study is analytical, based on desktop research. The 
desktop research entails a literature review of the available materials (see 
literature review).  
 
The researcher relies on both primary sources of information, such as 
Acts of Parliament, international agreements, statutes of international 
bodies, and secondary sources, such as commentaries, works of 
scholars, newspaper articles etc.  
1.9.0. Chapter Breakdown 
The study will be completed in five chapters. Chapter 1 is the 
introduction to the study and introduces the thinking underlying the 
study, as well as the study itself. It comprises of the background, 
statement of the problem, objectives, hypotheses and literature review. 
 
Chapter 2 sets out the legal and institutional framework that would 
enable a government to participate effectively in the capital market. It 
discusses government bonds and their attractiveness to investors, and 
how a government could improve the government bonds competitiveness 
in the markets and trading to develop capital markets, while 
safeguarding against bad effects such as exchange risks and crises. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the direct participation of the private sector in 
government project financing and the enabling legal and institutional 
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frameworks. Since this relates more to the area of contract, the study 
looks at the ways to enforce contracts, dispute resolution, and the 
enforcements of awards/ damages. This is looked at with a view to 
enhancing investor confidence and reducing the cost of capital. 
 
Chapter 4 examines an innovative debt financing model based on the 
Kenya fuel levy fund. The model is built on the assumption of the 
government debt being risk free because it is backed by the ability of the 
government to pay its debts through taxation. The Kenya fuel levy is a 
tax on fuel that is earmarked for road maintenance rehabilitation and 
development but has not been innovatively utilised e.g. through 
securitisation of the fund to get huge debt for road development and 
maintenance. 
 
Chapter 5 draws some important lessons from the foregoing study, and 
contains  recommendations and conclusions. 
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Governmental, Institutional and Market 
Based Sources of Capital 
2.1.0. Introduction 
According to standard neoclassical economic theory, capital scarce 
countries should borrow large amounts of capital to finance domestic 
investment that they cannot finance through other means, or to smooth 
national consumption.1 The need to finance governments’ deficits, new 
investments, development projects such as infrastructure etc., is 
complemented by the development of sources, and various methods, 
through which governments can raise the requisite capital.  
 
The choice of the finance facility that a particular government would 
choose is dependent on many variables. However, at the top of the 
considerations would be the cost of obtaining the finance in terms of 
interest rates, availability of the finance facility as and when the country 
needs the funds, grace period before repaying the principal and interest, 
the duration of the loan, and the flexibility accompanying the utilisation 
of the funds.  
 
This Chapter briefly introduces some of the methods that sub-Saharan 
Africa countries have relied upon in financing government operations, 
such as loans and grants from other governments, loans and grants from 
the International financial institutions e.g. World Bank, IMF, African 
Development Bank (AfDB) etc., loans from commercial banks, either 
                                                 
1  L Robert, Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries? (1990) 80 American Economic Review, 
Papers and Proceedings 92. 
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locally or internationally, trade credit from suppliers, and selling of 
government debt papers/bonds.  
 
The Chapter concludes by looking into the development of a government 
bond market as one of the developing ways that sub-Saharan African 
governments can utilise to develop resilience to changing donor 
countries’ foreign policy, negative effects and venerability of their 
economies to such risks associated with foreign debt, and getting long-
term capital to finance infrastructure development.    
2.2.0. Loans and Grants from other Governments 
It is difficult to give a full account of this source of funds (otherwise 
called official development assistance (ODA)2) because of its disjointed 
nature. The funds are in many instances formalised through a bilateral 
lending agreement, therefore making it hard to trace how they are 
disbursed other than when disclosed through membership organisations 
like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the European Union (EU).3 However, it is shown that, 
mostly, such loans or grants are made by the developed countries to the 
developing countries.4 In other cases the developed countries have 
extended these funds through the international financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank5, AfDB6 etc. 
                                                 
2  The full definition of ODA according to OECD glossary of statistical terms is ‘Flows of official financing 
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the 
main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent 
(using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount)’. 
3  OECD and EU keep statistics of Official Development Assistance, see www.oecd.org and 
http://europa.eu. 
4  Sub-Sahara Africa and development finance’, selected essays on development finance and the role of the 
lawyer in international debt operations. www.unitar.org/dfm .  
5  The World Bank is a trustee of the Global Environment facility (GEF) as well as an implementing agency. 
GEF is a trust fund by the donor countries that provides grants to developing countries for projects that 
benefit the global environment and promote sustainable livelihoods in local communities. More 
information about GEF can be accessed on http://www.gefweb.org/ (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
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 The United States of America (USA) channels some of its development 
assistance through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).7 The 
MCC is responsible for the stewardship of the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA), which receives funds appropriated by Congress every 
year.8 The eligibility criteria for funds in the MCA are based on 
demonstration of a commitment to policies that promote political and 
economic freedom, investments in education and health, control of 
corruption, and respect for civil liberties and the rule of law.9
 
Similarly, the EU has the European Development Fund (EDF)10 which is 
the main instrument for providing community aid for development 
cooperation in the African Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) and the 
overseas countries and territories (OCT).  The EDF is not yet under the 
direct Community budget, and therefore is still funded by member 
states, is subject to its own financial rules, and is managed by a specific 
committee. Member states continue to have their own bilateral 
agreements and implement their own initiatives with developing 
countries that are not financed by the EDF or any other Community 
fund.11
 
Despite this multifaceted approach to ODA, it is agreed that the amount 
of finance available to the developing countries is still below the 
                                                                                                                                                 
6  The AfDB is one of the seven executing agencies  of GEF which includes four regional development banks 
and UN affiliate bodies. See http://www.gefweb.org/ (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
7  The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a United States Government corporation designed to 
work with some of the poorest countries in the world, it was established in January 2004. 
8  http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php (accessed on 26/03/2007). 
9  Ibid, also see www.usaid.gov (accessed on 26/03/2007) . 
10  Founded in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome with the view of granting technical and financial assistance, 
initially to African countries which at the time were still colonised and with which some member states 
had historical links. Available at http://europa.eu (accessed on 26/03/2007).   
11  See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12102.htm ( accessed 26/03/2007). 
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threshold required to propel them to the internationally agreed level of 
development.12 The conference in Monterrey of the heads of states and 
governments on financing for development pointed out that,13   
 
…a substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if 
developing countries are to achieve the internationally agreed 
development goals and objectives, including those contained in the 
Millennium Declaration. 
 
The conference further resolved to make concrete efforts towards setting 
aside 0.7 percent of donor countries’ gross national product (GNP) as 
ODA to developing countries. However, Norway, Denmark, Luxemburg, 
Sweden and the Netherlands are the only countries that have been able 
to meet this target.14 On the contrary, OECD statistics show that aid 
flows in 2005 to the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa actually 
stalled.15  
 
The flow of the concessional funds from developed countries to sub-
Saharan Africa is not certain. Most of the funds that were available as 
ODA in 2005 were in the form of debt relief;16 though welcomed, it does 
not provide the requisite capital for new investments. Policy makers in 
sub-Saharan Africa face an arduous task to come up with concrete 
polices that will see the region changing from over-reliance on official 
                                                 
12  United Nations, ‘Monterrey consensus of the international conference on financing for development’, 
(2003) available at www.un.org/esa/ffd (accessed on 26/03/2007). 
13  UN conference of heads of state and governments, Monterrey, Mexico, 21 and 22 March 2002. 
14  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Official_development_assistance#_note-0 also OECD final ODA data for 
2005 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf (accessed on 25/03/2007). 
15  Statistics at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
16  The lion’s share of the aid increase in 2005 came from debt relief grants, which more than tripled, OECD 
final ODA data for 2005 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/18/37790990.pdf (accessed on 25/03/ 
2007). 
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finance which is comprised of loans and grants from agencies and 
governments of developed economies.17   
2.3.0. Loans and Grants from International Financial 
Institutions 
International financial institutions (IFIs) are basically intergovernmental 
bodies created for different purposes in accordance with their Articles of 
Agreement. The study briefly introduces The World Bank (i.e. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
International Development Association (IDA)), IMF and AfDB as some of 
the most common sources of finances for the sub-Saharan Africa region. 
2.3.1. The World Bank 
The World Bank Group,18 as it is rightly called, is comprised of: 
1. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
2. International Development Association (IDA), 
3. International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
4. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and 
5. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
 
IBRD, IDA and IFC are the lending arms of the World Bank Group; 
however, IFC lends to the private sector and therefore will not be 
discussed in this study. MIGA and ICSID will be discussed later on in the 
study. 
 
IBRD and IDA are commonly known as the World Bank.19 However, 
though both are vital sources of financial and technical assistance to 
developing countries around the world, IBRD focuses on middle income 
                                                 
17  ‘Sub-Sahara Africa and development finance’, selected essays on development finance and the role of the 
lawyer in international debt operations. www.unitar.org/dfm . 
18  See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0 accessed on 26/03/2007. 
19  Ibid. 
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and creditworthy-poor countries, while IDA focuses on the poorest 
countries in the world.20
IBRD 
IBRD came into existence on 27/12/1945 following international 
ratification of the agreements reached at the United Nations Monetary 
and Financial Conference of July 1 to July 22, 1994, at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire.21 Its purpose then was to finance the reconstruction of 
nations devastated by World War II (WWII); now its mission has 
expanded to fighting poverty by means of financing states, giving 
guarantees for private investment, etc.22
 
Member states subscribe for share capital in the Bank by having 20 
percent of the allotted shares as paid up or subject to call, and the 
remaining 80 per cent as callable capital.23 Since the members’ 
contribution as share capital is not enough, and furthermore the 
majority of it is not paid up, IBRD relies on the international capital 
markets24 to raise the funds it lends to its borrowers, and for its 
operations. It issues bonds which have a high credit rating25 of ‘AAA’ (the 
highest possible) because they are backed by member states' callable 
share capital, as well as by borrowers' sovereign guarantees.26  
 
                                                 
20  Ibid. 
21  see Preamble IBRD article of agreement on http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/ 
Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf (accessed on 26/03/2007). 
22  Article 1: Purpose, IBRD articles of agreements. 
23  Article II: Membership in and Capital of the Bank, IBRD articles of agreements. 
24  IBRD raises most of its funds on the world's financial markets see http://web.worldbank.org (accessed 
on 26/03/2007). 
25  The IBRD bonds are ‘AAA’ rated, see http://web.worldbank.org (accessed on 26/03/2007). 
26  See ‘Raising Capital’ what is the World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
EXTABOUTUS/0,,ontentMDK:20040558~menuPK:34559~pagePK:34542~piPK:36600,00.html (accessed 
on 26/03/2007). 
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Due to the low cost of borrowing that IBRD enjoys, it is able to pass on 
low interest rates to its borrowers (developing countries), making its 
interest rates more competitive than the rates offered in the international 
capital markets to some borrower countries due to lack of high credit 
rating. 27  Similarly, IBRD offers long term loans to borrowers e.g. some 
countries may get terms of repayment with a grace period of 8 years and 
overall repayment period of 20 years.28 Furthermore, IBRD provide 
borrowers with products that give them the flexibility to select terms that 
are consistent with their debt management strategy and suited to their 
debt servicing capacity.29
 
However, since the Bank’s most valuable asset is its credit rating, it 
obliges IBRD to maintain stringent risk management strategies to reduce 
credit exposure and default risk. Amongst the strategies it applies are: 
limiting the amounts of loans disbursed, and ensuring that 
disbursement is only to creditworthy borrowers.30 Such stringent 
measures cut out many of the sub-Saharan African countries from the 
funds of IBRD, since most countries in the region do not meet the 
threshold for borrowing from IBRD by virtue of their lack of 
                                                 
27  The low borrowing cost spreads obtained by IBRD in the markets have enabled IBRD clients to borrow 
from the IBRD at fine spreads over the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). For example, from 1993 
to 2002, the lending rate on the Variable-Spread Loan (VSL) ranged from LIBOR + 0.37% to LIBOR + 
0.54%.; the lending rate as of July 1, 2002 on the Fixed-Spread Loan (FSL) was LIBOR + 0.55%. For 
borrowers eligible for interest rate waivers, the net lending rate ranged from LIBOR + 0.12% to LIBOR + 
0.29% for VSLs, and as of July 1, 2002 was LIBOR + 0.30% for FSLs in US$. In contrast, direct 
borrowing costs in international capital markets for most IBRD borrowers may range from LIBOR + 
1.00% to LIBOR + 7.00%. see http://treasury.worldbank.org/Services/Financial+Products/FAQs/   
Financial+Products.html (accessed 27/03/2007). 
28  see Financial terms and conditions of IBRD loans, at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional 
/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/whatnewvirt/4E2546F2C36F02708525672C007D08DC?OpenDocument#foot 
(accessed on 27/03/2007). 
29  Ibid. IBRD offers two loan products for new loan commitments: fixed-spread loans, and variable-spread 
loans (VSLs, formerly known as variable-rate single currency loans or VSCLs). 
30  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ‘Information Statement’ September 2005, see 
also supra n19. 
 20
creditworthiness, and since their gross national income (GNI) per capita 
is less than that required to borrow from IBRD.31  
IDA 
The realisation that poorer developing countries needed softer terms than 
those that could be offered by IBRD, so that they could afford to borrow 
the capital they needed to facilitate growth, led to the formation of  IDA 
in 1960.32 The purposes of IDA are outlined in the Articles of Agreement 
as,33  
 
… to promote economic development, increase productivity and thus 
raise standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world included 
within the Association's membership, in particular by providing finance to 
meet their important developmental requirements on terms which are more 
flexible and bear less heavily on the balance of payments than those of 
conventional loans, thereby furthering the developmental objectives of the 
[IBRD] and supplementing its activities (own emphasis). 
 
IDA is therefore the leading source of concessional credits and loans to 
sub-Saharan Africa, with 39 countries out of the 82 countries eligible to 
draw on IDA credits being from Africa.34 IDA credits have maturities of 
                                                 
31  Countries are eligible for IBRD on the basis of creditworthiness. The operational cut-off for IBRD 
eligibility for fiscal 2006 was a 2004 GNI per capita above $965, using Atlas methodology. Although IDA 
can extend eligibility temporarily to countries that are above the operational cut-off and are undertaking 
major adjustment efforts but are not creditworthy for IBRD lending. An exception has been made for 
small island economies. See World bank annual Report 2005 also available on 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTANNREP/EXTANNREP2K5/0,,   
contentMDK:20647778~menuPK:1578499~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1397343,00.ht
ml. (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
32  World Bank, ‘IDA history’ what is IDA? at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL /EXTABOU 
TUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,
00.html (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
33  IDA Articles of Agreement Article one: Purpose 
34  World Bank, what is IDA? at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,, 
contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html  
(accessed on 27/03/2007). 
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20, 35 or 40 years, with a 10-year grace period before repayment of 
principal begins.35 Thus IDA credits and loans are a long term 
concessional source of funds. Also, there is no interest charge, though 
credits do carry a small service charge, currently 0.75 per cent on funds 
paid out.36  
 
IDA’s credits are focused towards primary education, basic health 
services, clean water and sanitation, environmental safeguards, business 
climate improvements, infrastructure and institutional reforms.37 The 
rationale is that the projects pave the way for economic growth, job 
creation, higher incomes and better living conditions. However, just 
being a poor country does not make a country eligible for IDA funds; the 
funds are allocated to the borrowing countries in relation to their income 
levels38 and record of success in managing their economies and their 
ongoing IDA projects.39  
 
Despite the focus areas of the IDA funds being wide and therefore 
making them overstretched, there is little room for its expansion since 
IDA relies on replenishment.40 Donors meet every three years to review 
IDA’s policies and to replenish IDA funds which comprise contributions 
                                                 
35  World Bank, ‘IDA lending’ what is IDA? at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOU 
TUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154, 
00html  (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  IDA borrowing countries must have a GNI per capita of below $965. However, IDA can extend eligibility 
temporarily to countries that are above the operational cut-off and are undertaking major adjustment 
efforts but are not creditworthy for IBRD lending. An exception has been made for small island 
economies. See World bank annual Report 2005 also available on http://web.worldbank.org/ 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTANNREP/EXTANNREP2K5/0,,contentMDK:20647778~menuPK
:1578499~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1397343,00.html. (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
39  Ibid. 
40  World Bank, ‘IDA funding’ what is IDA? at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOU 
TUS/IDA/html  (accessed on 27/03/2007). 
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by governments of the richer member countries, funds derived from 
IBRD's income, and from borrowers' repayments of earlier IDA credits.41   
 
Donors who are mostly the wealthy members of IDA,42 contribute most of 
the funds, e.g. donor contributions accounted for more than half of the 
US$33 billion in the IDA14 replenishment.43 The problem with donor 
reliance is that IDA is not self-sufficient and therefore vulnerable to 
global events, e.g. the war on terror, natural calamities like tsunami 
which are potential aid diversion interests to the donors.44    
2.3.2. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
IMF was conceived in July 1944 at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,45 and just like 
IBRD it is a Bretton Woods Institution. It came into effect in December 
1945 when its first 29 member countries signed its Articles of Agreement. 
 
The IMF performs three main activities:46
1. Monitoring national, global, and regional economic and financial 
developments, and advising member countries on their economic 
policies (‘surveillance’);  
                                                 
41  Ibid. 
42  The top ten contributors are, US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, Italy, Canada, Netherlands and 
Switzerland in that order. Less wealthy nations that also contribute to IDA are Turkey and Korea. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21205385~pagePK:
51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html (accessed on 28/03/2007). 
43  IDA 14 is the latest replenishment negotiations ending February 2005. http://siteresources.worldbank 
.org/IDA/Resources/Updaterecentdevelopments.pdf (accessed on 28/03/2007). 
44  See e.g. the IDA 14 received good contributions due to the 2004 tsunami which placed to fund the 
countries affected.  . http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Updaterecentdevelopments.pdf 
(accessed on 28/03/2007). 
45  What is IMF? ‘why was it created’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (accessed on 
28/03/2007). 
46  IMF Article of Agreements: Art I-Purposes as extrapolated in, What is IMF? ‘how does IMF serve its 
member countries?’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (accessed on 28/03/2007). 
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2. Lending members hard currencies to support policy programs 
designed to correct balance of payments problems; and  
3. Offering technical assistance in its areas of expertise, as well as 
training for government and central bank officials.  
 
The study focuses on the lending role of the IMF which is for the purpose 
of correcting balance of payments problems,47 and the ability of the IMF 
programs to signal that a country's economic policies are on the right 
track. 
 
The IMF is not a development institution. It does not and, under its 
Articles of Agreement,48 it cannot provide loans to help poor countries 
build their physical infrastructure, diversify their export or other sectors, 
or develop better education and health care systems.49 This is the job of 
the World Bank and the regional development banks.50 However, the 
introduction of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) which 
lends on concessional fixed interest rates terms,51 to the low income 
countries has come under scrutiny as dabbling in the work of the World 
Bank and other development banks in development policy lending.52
 
                                                 
47  Ibid. 
48  IMF Article of Agreements: Art I-Purposes. 
49  What is IMF? ‘how does IMF help poor countries?’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm 
(accessed on 28/03/2007), see also article of agreement, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/ 
index.htm (accessed on 28/03/2007).  
50  Policy-based lending in support of a country’s policy program accounts for about one-third of the World 
Bank’s annual lending. The Bank’s other lending instrument – investment lending – funds projects such 
as road and school construction. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,content 
MDK:20237378~menuPK:34457~pagePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 
on 27/03/2007). 
51  PRGF offer a fixed interest rate of 0.5 per cent, and with a maturity of 10 years. What is IMF? 
‘Instruments of IMF lending’, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm (accessed on 
28/03/2007). 
52  See What is IMF? how does IMF help poor countries? (n49). 
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On the other hand, IMF programs signal that a country's economic 
policies are on the right track thereby reassuring investors and the 
development community.53 IMF's endorsement of a country’s policies can 
make it easier for that country to borrow on affordable terms in 
international capital markets or from other lenders.54   
 
The requirement, that for a country to be a member of the Word Bank it 
has to be a member of the IMF,55 ensures that all of the countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa are members of the Fund. Therefore, besides 
ensuring that the region’s microeconomic policies are put under scrutiny 
by the Fund, the countries can take advantage of the its programmes, 
like the policy support instrument (PSI), to enhance confidence for their 
activities in the international capital markets while raising capital for 
infrastructure development. 
2.3.3. African Development Bank (AfDB) 
The Agreement establishing the AfDB came into force on 10/09/1964 
after twenty member states subscribed to 65 per cent of the initial 
authorised share capital.56  
 
The purposes of the Bank are outlined in Article 1 of the agreement 
establishing AfDB:57 “… to contribute to the sustainable economic 
                                                 
53  The Policy Support Instrument (PSI), introduced in October 2005. PSI signal to donors, multilateral 
development banks, and markets the Fund's endorsement of a member countries’ effective economic 
programs/policies. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm (accessed on 28/03/2007). 
54  Under a mechanism introduced by the IMF in 2005—the PSI—countries can request that the IMF 
regularly and frequently review their economic programs to ensure that they are on track. Supra n49.  
55  Article II Section 1 IBRD articles of agreement – membership is open to the members of the fund and 
Article II Section 1 IDA articles of agreement – membership is open to membership of the IBRD. 
www.worldbank.org (accessed 27/03/2007). 
56  Agreement establishing the AfDB, see Article 65 on Entry into force. Also available on  http://www.afdb. 
org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/LEGALINFORMATION/AGREEMENT_ESTA
BLISHING_ADB_JULY2002_EN.DOC (accessed on 30/03/2007). 
57  Article 1 agreement establishing AfDB. 
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development and social progress of its regional members individually and 
jointly.” In this regard the agreement outlines some functions in Article 2 
to help the bank implement its purposes which may be summarised as:58
1. Financing of investment projects and programmes relating to 
economic and social development; and 
2.  Provision of technical assistance. 
 
The Bank provides long-term financing to suit the needs of its borrowers. 
Loans may have a maximum maturity of up to twenty years, inclusive of 
the grace period.59 Though project specific grace periods may be 
incorporated in the loan structure to take into account the cash flow 
profile and needs over the life of the project, they generally do not exceed 
five years.60
 
Like IBRD, AfDB relies on its high credit rating to be able to borrow in 
the international capital market at competitive rates, and then pass on 
those rates to its borrowers.61 The major rating agencies, Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and the Japanese Credit Rating Agency have 
assigned an AAA rating to AfDB long term senior debt, and an AA+ to its 
subordinated debt. The outlook on all the ratings is stable and reflects 
the Bank’s strong membership support, healthy capital adequacy, 
preferred creditor status and strong financial condition.62
                                                 
58  Article 2 Agreement establishing AfDB. 
59  AfDB guidelines for public sector loans – maturity, available http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs 
/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/FINANCIALINFORMATION/BROCHURE%20ENGLISH%20REVIS
ED%2024%20JUNE%2005.PDF (accessed on 30/03/2007).  
60  AfDB guidelines for public sector loans –  grace period. 
61  The bank’s interest rates terms equals to base rate plus lending margin where the lending margin for the 
sovereign borrowers is currently pegged at 40 basis points.  See Financial products offered by the AfDB. 
Publication available on http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS 
/FINANCIALINFORMATION/BROCHURE%20ENGLISH%20REVISED%2024%20JUNE%2005.PDF 
(accessed on 30/03/2007). 
62  Ratings of AfDB http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,968878&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
(accessed on 30/03/2007). 
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 The Bank’s clients are the member states,63 public sector enterprises64 
and private sector enterprises.65 Interest rates are calculated as a base 
rate plus a lending margin. The Bank offers floating, variable and fixed 
base rates. The lending margin for public sector sovereign guaranteed 
loans for regional member countries is set at forty basis points, while 
that of the public sector enterprises and private sector enterprises is 
dependent on project specific risk-based margins.66
 
This is a good initiative for Africa and particularly the sub-Saharan 
African region. However, the region still needs more funds to achieve the 
internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those 
contained in the Millennium Declaration, as was noted by the 
participants in the Monterrey conference on financing for development.67
2.4.0. Loans from Commercial Banks either Locally or 
Internationally 
Governments are eligible to borrow from commercial banks either locally 
or internationally. However, commercial banks funds are somewhat 
different from the other sources of funds discussed in the preceding 
sections. While a government can access funds to fund general budgetary 
deficits, e.g. to pay salaries of civil servants, because it is suffering from 
balance of payment deficits or funding for policy change e.g. from ODA, 
                                                 
63   Financial products offered by the AfDB. Publication available on http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal 
/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/FINANCIALINFORMATION/BROCHURE%20ENGLISH%20
REVISED%2024%20JUNE%2005.PDF (accessed on 30/03/2007). 
64  majority sharer capital is owned by the government or by corporation, the capital of which majority is 
owned by the Government of an eligible country, including cases of full (or 100%) ownership.  Refer to 
Financial products offered by the AfDB note 62. 
65  To be eligible for financing, an enterprise should be privately owned and managed, meaning that more 
than 50% of its voting shares must be in private hands. Refer to note above. 
66  see Financial products offered by the AfDB (n 63). 
67  see UN conference of heads of state and governments (n13). 
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World Bank and IMF, the same may not apply to commercial bank 
financing. Commercial banks in most cases insist on security for their 
loans, thereby making commercial banks’ finance project based, since 
the project or expected income68 from the project can be tendered as 
security for the loan. 
 
Because the study’s focus is on investment in transport infrastructure, it 
is hard to conceive of a situation where the government might tender a 
constructed road as security in event of default, because roads are public 
utilities which in many cases have no direct monetary returns to the 
government. However, with the innovative styles of financing 
infrastructure e.g. toll roads where the users pay for the use of the 
road,69 such a scenario is not hard to conceive since the revenue 
generated by tolls could be securitised.   
 
Banks, on the other hand, may not be willing to solely assume the 
funding and credit risks of huge loans associated with infrastructure 
projects, or the borrowing requirements for the infrastructure project 
may be beyond the funding and credit risk capacity of a single lender. In 
other cases, the statutory liquidity requirements may be prohibitive 
despite the willingness of a bank, particularly where the bank has a 
shallow capital base.70 As a result some loans are arranged as syndicates 
with the funds jointly provided by two or more lenders. Though there is a 
single loan agreement, each participant to a syndicated loan maintains a 
                                                 
68  Expected income can be securitised as an asset because businesses can be able to predict future cash 
flow. See discussion on securitization in A Harwood (Edt) Building Local Bond Markets: An Asian 
perspective IFC publication 2000. 
69  See D Grimsey & MK Lewis Public private partnerships: The worldwide revolution in infrastructure 
provision and project finance (2004) for general discussions on PPPs. 
70  See e.g. Kenya Banking Act (Cap 488 Laws of Kenya) sec 10 (1) limits on advances credits and guarantee 
such that a banking  institution cannot give advances, credit, guarantee or incur liability to the tune of 
25 per centum on one client / client and his associates.  
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separate claim and bears the credit risk for the portion of the loan that it 
has provided.71
 
The study has hitherto impliedly insisted on some qualities in the finance 
facility for infrastructure financing, viz, it should be long-term, and the 
cost of finance should be low to facilitate development and guard against 
bad externalities, such as the financial crises suffered in East Asia.72 
However, in the sub-Saharan African region the inflation rate is high,73 
which feeds directly into the length of time to maturity of possible loans 
and the cost of borrowing.74 Similarly, exchange rate volatility is not good 
either; if external conditions deteriorate, debt servicing costs on existing 
loans automatically increase.75 Deterioration in global conditions can 
cause currency to weaken and asset value to decline; debt costs, 
however, if they are fixed in foreign currency increase.76 Maturities are 
also short, as the banks would not like to be exposed to the exchange 
rate risks of the sub-Saharan African region.77
 
                                                 
71  Institutional Markets Section, syndicated lending Domestic Markets Department Bulletin (2005) also 
available on http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_sep05/PDF/bu_ 0905_1.pdf. 
(accessed on 30/03/2007). 
72  A Harwood et al. The crisis in emerging financial markets: a World Bank Group report -Brookings 
conference (1999) available on www.brookings.edu (accessed on 25/11/2006). Role of foreign investors in 
the Asian debacle … it is widely accepted that foreign banks extended excessive short-term credits (in 
foreign currencies) to emerging-market borrowers and pulled back when crisis hit. 
73  The Heritage Foundation, 2007 Index of economic freedom sub-Saharan Africa (region E) available on 
http://www.heritage.org/index/ (accessed on 31/03/2007) [sub-Saharan Africa inflation is] 15 percent 
on average which is twice as high the next worst region. 
74  The World Bank & The IMF, Developing  government bond markets: A Handbook (2001). 
75  A Harwood (ed) Building Local Bond Markets: An Asian perspective IFC publication (2000). 
76  Ibid. 
77  D Ratha and U Dadush, the role of short-term debt in recent crises Finance and development magazine, 
December 2000 Volume 37, Number 4. online edition available on https://www.imf.org/external/pubs 
/ft/fandd /2000/12/dadush.htm (accessed on 29/03/2007) ... The  rapid build-up of short-term debt 
was a key factor in the financial crises that rocked Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98, and Russia 
and Brazil in 1998-99.
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Long term policies should be put in place in the region, since in the 
foreseeable future banks will continue to be the main vehicles through 
which savings are channelled into investments.78 Encouraging savings 
through managing inflation and encouraging local currency funding, 
would be some of the immediate solutions to participation of bank 
funding in infrastructure development. Maintaining credible policies in 
exchange rates would see the stabilisation of exchange rates; thereby 
reducing the exchange rate risks and encouraging foreign investors’ 
capital participation in infrastructure development. 
 
In more developed financial systems like those of the USA and Australia 
syndicated loans have acquired characteristics similar to those of 
privately placed corporate bonds.79 This has seen the loans acquire 
longer maturities and the development of a secondary market for lenders 
to trade in their loan shares, much like bonds.80 Similarly, a strong 
supply of funds from domestic and foreign banks leads to narrowing of 
spreads.81
2.5.0. Selling of Government Debt Papers 
Debt papers generally are instruments that obligate the issuer to pay the 
holder the principal plus interest. Therefore, they are essentially an I.O.U 
(I owe you contract) issued by the issuer (borrower) and purchased by 
the holder (investor). 
 
Government debt papers comprise of treasury bills (T-bills) and treasury 
bonds (T-bonds). The difference between the two is that T-bills are short-
                                                 
78  see A Harwood et al. (n72). 
79  see Domestic Markets Department Bulletin (n71). 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
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term, with maturities of one year and less,82 while those of T-bonds are 
above one year.83 Bonds are further classified by the length of 
maturity:84
• Short-term bonds – mature in the next few years, e.g. one to three 
years. 
• Intermediate-term bonds – come due within three to ten years 
• Long-term bonds – mature in more than ten years and generally up to 
thirty years 
This classification is arbitrary; the USA treasuries with maturity between 
one to seven years are called treasury notes, while those with maturities 
above seven years are called treasury bonds.85 However, most of the 
time, longer-term bonds pay higher yields (coupon or spread) than short-
term bonds.86
 
This section of the study looks at some of the legal and institutional 
frameworks in developing the government bonds for the purposes of 
raising long-term debt for financing infrastructure development.  
2.5.1. Conceptualising the bond market 
The bond market is made up of different players, as illustrated in figure 
2.0. The main ones are the issuers and investors; in this case the 
government is the issuer with the long-term financial needs, while the 
investors could be savers in the economy or outside with the need to 
place their savings or other liquid funds in interest bearing securities.  
                                                 
82  Investing glossary on the web, http://www.investorwords.com/5060/Treasury_bills.html (accessed on 
02/04/2007).  
83  Investing glossary on the web, http://www.investorwords.com/521/bond.html - a debt instrument 
issued for a period of more than one year with the purpose of raising capital by borrowing. cf. in the US, 
government paper with maturity between 1&7 years is called Treasury Note   (accessed on 02/04/2007).  
84  K Morris, bonds and other lending investments Wall street journal guide to understanding money and 
investing, (2000). 
85  See investing glossary on the web, ( n 83). 
86  See K Morris (n 84). 
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 The issuer and the investors are linked together by the intermediaries,87 
the level of the market notwithstanding. This is because the 
intermediaries have a role to play in the primary and secondary markets 
in bringing together the issuer and investors. These transactions are 
carried out in an environment that allows safe dealings.  
 
Figure 2.0: Conceptualisation of the 
Bond Market 88
 
Issuer with long-term     Investors with a need to  
financial needs  place savings or other  
  liquid funds in interest  
  bearing securities 
 
 
 
 
- Intermediaries - to bring together 
investors and issuers either in the primary 
or secondary market 
 
- Infrastructure - to provide a conducive 
environment for securities transaction, 
ensure legal title to securities and 
settlement of transactions and price 
discovery information 
 
 
Regulatory regime - to provide the basic 
framework for bond markets and indeed 
for capital markets in general 
  
 
The objective being that clearing, settlement and depository operations 
are surer and quicker, ensuring availability of securities to the buyer and 
funds to the seller for their next financial transactions after their trade is 
executed. The whole market should be regulated by a regulatory regime 
                                                 
87  This include dealers, brokers, investment banks etc. 
88  Source: Authors Understanding.  
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that ensures that all players are well protected and the integrity of the 
market is maintained. 
 
Efficient bond markets are characterised by a competitive market 
structure, low transaction costs, low levels of fragmentation, a robust 
and safe market infrastructure, and a high level of heterogeneity among 
market participants.89
Advantages of developing a government bond market 
The development of a domestic government bond market provides a 
number of important benefits if the prerequisites90 for a sound 
development are in place. The benefits include: 
1. Funding of government’s budgetary deficits; 
2. Reduced need for foreign currency financing which is potentially 
damaging, and avoids build-ups of foreign currency denominated 
debts;91 
3. Strengthens the transmission and implementation of monetary policy, 
including the monetary targets or inflation objectives, through the 
open market operation (OMO).92 
4. Coupled with prudent debt management, could help governments 
reduce their exposure to interest rate, currency and other financial 
risks. 
5. In the long term it would reduce the debt service cost, if based on 
market forces.93  
                                                 
89  The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74). 
90  see The World Bank & The IMF (n74) p36 “Prerequisites for establishing an efficient government domestic 
currency securities market include a credible and stable government; sound fiscal and monetary policies; 
effective legal, tax, and regulatory infrastructure; smooth and secure settlement arrangements; and a 
liberalized financial  system with competing intermediaries”. 
91  See D Ratha and U Dadush (n77) for the role played by short-term foreign currency-denominated debt.  
92  See The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p8 Most countries are moving from the use of direct monetary 
policy tools, such as interest rate controls and credit ceilings, to the use of indirect monetary policy 
instruments, such as open market operations. Indirect monetary policy instruments have the advantage 
of improving the efficiency of monetary policy by having financial resources allocated on a market basis.  
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6. Helps change the financial system from a primary bank-oriented to a 
multilayered system, where capital markets can complement bank 
financing – also creating competition for banks and therefore the 
introduction of new products at competitive prices. 
7. Developing a government securities market supports the development 
of bond markets for the sub-national and corporate sectors. The 
relatively risk free assets provided by government bonds establish a 
reference for pricing sub-national and corporate bonds, commercial 
papers or any kind of private sector fixed income securities.94  
2.5.2. Developing Government Bonds – Legal Framework 
Legal environment, as described by both legal rules and their 
enforcement (enforcement is discussed in the next chapter), matters for 
the size and extent of a country’s capital market.95 A good legal 
environment protects the potential financier (investor) against 
expropriation, thereby raising their willingness to surrender funds in 
exchange for securities, and thus expands the scope and depth of capital 
market.96  
 
The study looks at the legal framework in the light of: 
1. Increasing government bond credibility by reducing uncertainty, and 
so reducing the risk and the cost of capital. 
                                                                                                                                                 
93  DA Grigorian, IMF Working Paper, ‘on the determinants of first-time sovereign bond issues’ (2003) p 6 
“…countries that made repeated issues have established a track record – by, among other things, having 
issued at least one outstanding bond – there is little uncertainty about the spread at which these 
countries will sell their subsequent issue”. 
94  See The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p 67 “some governments such as those of Hong Kong, China  
which run government budget surplus and thus do not need issue bonds, developed a government bond 
market as a benchmark for their large mortgage market and the nascent corporate bond market.”. 
95  R La Porta et al. Legal determinates of  external finance, NBER working paper series, Working Paper 5879 
(1997). 
96  Ibid. 
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2. Increasing market participation by domestic and foreign investors to 
increase liquidity in the market so as to reduce the cost of capital and 
increase the length of maturity. 
 
Though part of the legal framework is specifically for government bonds, 
some parts, particularly with regard to secondary markets, apply to a 
cross-section of the market, since government bonds are traded 
alongside other securities in the securities’ exchange. 
Increasing government bond credibility 
Government bonds are a special type of securities traded on the faith of 
the government’s ability to pay its obligations under the debt 
instruments.97 Unlike corporate bonds, mortgage bonds etc., where there 
is some kind of a security, government bonds are backed by the faith 
that the government is able to pay at least through increasing tax or 
printing new money. However, the perception of risk or the possibility of 
the government to renegade on its commitment to pay, leads to an 
increase in the borrowing cost for the government in terms of a high 
coupon rate.98  
 
An effective legal framework is a key foundation of an effective 
government securities market. The legal framework should set out clear 
government borrowing authority and establish the process for issuance 
of government securities.   
 
By setting out clear authority to borrow, the law establishes explicit 
parameters for the government in borrowing, and serves to connect the 
                                                 
97  RG Gelos et al. IMF Working Paper, ‘sovereign borrowing by developing countries: what determines 
market access?’ WP/04/221 (2004) p4 “… the ability of a sovereign government to borrow on 
international credit markets depends on its perceived ability to repay and on the incentives it will have to 
do it”. 
98  Coupon rate is the rate of interest on the government paper, may be referred to as spread or yield. 
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debt obligation to the government or state, thereby providing investors 
with the assurance of repayment when the government changes hands. 
99 Lack of clarity regarding the borrowing authority can increase the cost 
of debt financing because there is uncertainty as to government’s control 
over payment, e.g. if it is not clear which organ of the state has the 
mandate to borrow and authorize payment. Credit-rating agencies focus 
on this clarity or ambiguity in legislative control of government borrowing 
activity as a way of measuring the prospects of the government servicing 
its debt.100
 
The authority to borrow may be entrenched in the constitution e.g. as in 
Sweden and Kenya. However, due to the rigidity of the constitutions, they  
 give a general authority which is implemented by an Act of 
Parliament.101 The legislation governing government borrowing may 
establish details of borrowing authority, including issuance limits, 
internal procedures, transparency, and accountability. These details 
might also be contained in guidelines, policies, or regulations that 
accompany the legislation.102
Increasing market participation  
The legal framework can be effective in increasing market participation, 
particularly by making provision for a secondary market, protection of 
investors to enhance confidence, and provision for foreign investors’ 
capital participation.  
 
                                                 
99  See The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74); see also Kenyan constitution Section 103 authorises for all debt 
incurred by the government to be charged on the consolidated fund. 
100  Issue Credit Rating Definitions by Standard & poor’s available on http://www2.standardandpoors.com 
/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Emerging_102004R.pdf?vregion=us&vlang=en (accessed on 03/04/2007). 
101  See e.g. Kenya constitution Section 103 authorises for all debt incurred by the government to be charged 
on the consolidated fund. Internal Loans Act (Cap 420) section 3 gives the powers to borrow in Kenyan 
shillings to the minister in charge of finance and prescribe such methods which include issuing bonds. 
102  See Internal Loans Act (Cap 420 law of Kenya). 
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Secondary market as a platform for trading in government securities is 
covered under institutional frameworks. This section looks at the legal 
framework of the secondary market that enhances participation and 
increases liquidity, thus lowering the cost of capital.103 The benefits of 
liquid secondary markets are adequately explained by the World Bank 
and IMF:104  
 
Government securities can have near-money like properties when 
secondary markets facilitate rapid and low-cost conversion into cash … 
Secondary markets also open avenues for risk management through 
various types of transactions whose pricing can be derived from 
government securities markets. These unique features of government 
securities markets help deepen the number and type of transactions in 
government securities which, in turn, help achieve the aim of establishing 
liquid and efficient secondary markets (own emphasis). 
 
Having a near-money like properties in government securities is an 
attribute that would encourage the participation of short term investors 
in long term government bonds, because investors are able to convert 
their investments into cash when they need the money, and at low cost. 
This subsequently reflects on the cost of government funding. The near-
money properties are only achievable in a liquid and efficient market. The 
study therefore looks at the legal factors that affect liquidity in the 
market. 
 
“Market liquidity”, is a business, economic or investment term that refers 
to an asset's ability to quickly be liquidated or converted through an 
                                                 
103  Institutional Markets Section, ‘syndicated lending’ Domestic Markets Department Bulletin September 
2005 also available on http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_sep05/PDF/bu_ 
0905_1.pdf. (accessed on 30/03/2007) ...a strong supply of funds from domestic and foreign banks leads 
to narrowing of spreads. 
104  See The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p18. 
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action of buying or selling without causing a significant movement in the 
price, and with minimum loss of value.105 A market is considered liquid if 
there are ready and willing buyers and sellers in large quantities.106  
 
Market liquidity may therefore be affected by the following factors:  
1. Transaction costs which comprises of taxes, brokerage commissions, 
fees payable to the regulator, the clearing house, the depository, etc. 
These costs should be low enough in order to constantly meet the 
investor’s trading needs. Taxes107 decrease the efficiency of financial 
markets by reducing liquidity and increasing transaction costs.108 
Similarly, high brokerage commissions and fees add to the 
transaction costs. When transaction costs are high, investors have no 
motivation to trade since their earnings are reduced. 
2. A diversified investor base for government securities is important for 
ensuring high liquidity and stable demand in the market. A diversified 
investor base with different time horizons, risk preferences, and 
trading motives, ensures active trading, creating high liquidity.109 
Policy should be made to encourage diversification of investors in 
government securities, e.g. for domestic participants, more saving 
should be encouraged because banks in developing countries will 
continue to be the main vehicle through which savings are channelled 
into investments.110 In the same light governments can,  through 
appropriate reform programs, licensing, regulations and supervision, 
encourage wholesale investor institution that invest in government 
                                                 
105  See definition on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquidity (accessed on 02/04/2007). 
106  Ibid.  
107  These include transaction taxes and stamp duties levied on the securities on trading. 
108 P Shome, and GS Janet. "Financial Transactions Taxes." Tax Notes International. (1996). 
109  See The World Bank & The IMF ( n74) p68. 
110  see A Harwood et al. (n72). see also The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p18 “… government-backed 
pension or social security systems through specialized funds has also provided a large, stable demand for 
fixed-income securities in countries where such funds are active”. 
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securities for income hedging, trading and repo transactions. 
Government can also develop a retail investor base, and can further 
broaden and diversify the investor base by opening the market to 
foreign investors. 
 
Market participation can also be enhanced through laws that encourage 
investor protection, by reducing transfer risks which are embodied in 
exchange controls and nationalisation of foreign assets which affect the 
ability to repatriate returns.  
2.5.3. Developing Government Bonds – Institutional Framework 
A sound institutional framework for a government bond market should 
embody good governance practices, prudent procedures, efficiency and a 
strong capacity for managing risks. The study looks at some of the 
institutions that are critical in the development of a government bond 
market: the central bank, security regulatory organisation (SRO), the 
central securities depository system (CSDS), and the securities exchange. 
The Central/Reserve Bank 
In many countries, the central bank provides services for government 
debt managers, including operating T-bills and T-bonds, undertaking 
cash management operations, and providing registry services.111 In some 
markets, like that of Kenya, the central bank could also undertake 
foreign currency borrowing and domestic borrowing.112 Such roles of the 
central bank, or any other government agency that carries out the role of 
debt manager for the government, should be set out in the country’s 
laws. To eliminate doubt on the part of potential investors in government 
                                                 
111  see The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) ‘overview’ p1-57. 
112  See External Loans and credit Act (Cap 422 Laws of Kenya) and Internal Loans Act (Cap 420 laws of 
Kenya). 
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bonds, the law should clearly indicate that financial obligations incurred 
by a delegated agency fully and wholly bind the state.113
 
As regards the management of the institution delegated with the 
authority to manage government debt: it should be run professionally, 
and the managers/ directors, and in case of the central or reserve banks, 
the governor, should be independent of political manipulation. Following 
prudent procedures and corporate governance principles in running 
critical institutions increases investor confidence and substantially 
reduces the investor’s perception of operational risks.114
Security regulatory organisation (SRO) 
In most countries where there is an infrastructure for a secondary 
market, 115 government securities trade along with all other securities. 
Effective regulation is necessary to support and maintain the integrity of 
the market. Because government securities are often defined as “exempt 
securities,” i.e. exempt from the stringent disclosures to which corporate 
bonds, for example, are subject, it is important to ensure that this status 
does not undermine the integrity of the market. 
 
The government should therefore establish a regulatory authority which 
should, in turn, have the legal authority to make and enforce rules and 
regulations related to market and business conduct, market 
                                                 
113  See e.g. The Kenyan Constitution section 103(1); all debt charges for which the Government of Kenya is 
liable shall be a charge on the Consolidated Fund;  Cap 422 section 4 provides “The repayment of all 
sums of money borrowed under [External Loans and Credit Act], and the payment of all money payable 
by the Government for goods or services purchased on credit under this Act, and the payment of all 
interest and other charges payable in respect thereof, shall be charged on the consolidated fund and 
issued out of it without further appropriation than this Act”. 
114  This includes a range of different types of risks, including transaction errors in the various stages of 
executing and recording transactions; inadequacies or failures in internal controls, or in systems and 
services; reputation risk; legal risk; security breaches; or natural disasters that affect business activity. 
115 Only 14 out of 47 sub-Saharan Africa countries have a stock/ securities exchange. See  http:// 
www.economywatch.com/stock-markets-in-world/sub-saharan-africa.html (accessed on 14/03/2007). 
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intermediaries and trading systems.116 The SRO should be operationally 
independent of government, preferably with autonomy over its budget.117
Central securities depository system (CSDS)   
CSDS provides the services of securities account maintenance, 
registration services, depository services and settlement services.118 
Development of a secure and credible depository and settlement system 
eliminates settlement risks119 which are evident in less-developed 
securities markets; thus encouraging more participation in the securities 
market by domestic and foreign investors. 
 
The World Bank and IMF advocate efforts to link CSDSs (custody 
arrangements) on a cross-border basis when markets systems are well 
developed to broaden the market base.120 For markets with a large 
foreign investor component, an efficient link between the national central 
securities depository and an international central securities depository, 
such as EUROCLEAR or Clearstream, is important for market 
development. International institutional investors prefer to hold their 
securities from different markets in one central place, where liquidity 
from the sale of securities from one country can be used immediately to 
fund the acquisition of securities from another.121 The preference for the 
use of international central depositories, however, also has its 
                                                 
116  See e.g. the objectives of Kenyan Capital Markets Authority, inter alia … the creation, maintenance and 
regulation, of a market in which securities can be issued and traded in an orderly, fair, and efficient 
manner, through the implementation of a system in which the market participants are self regulatory to 
the maximum practicable extent … the protection of investor interests. 
117  see The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p290. 
118  D Russo et al governance of security clearing and settlement systems, European Central bank, 
occasional paper series No 21 (2004) also available on http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp21. 
pdf (accessed on 02/04/2007). 
119 Refers to the potential loss that the parties could suffer as a result of failure to settle, for whatever reason 
other than default, by the counterparty. 
120  see The World Bank & The IMF, ( n74) p31. 
121  Ibid. 
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background in a more practical back-office argument, as it is 
administratively easier for the securities manager to deal with only one 
depository. 
 
Furthermore, the objective of clearing, settlement and depository 
operations is surer and quicker availability of securities to the buyer and 
funds to the seller for their next financial transactions after their trade is 
executed.122 For this reason, ensuring quicker and safer operations of 
the CSDS through automation would enhance liquidity and reduce 
operational risks associated with a manual order matching, 
confirmation, delivery of securities, and payment of funds, thus 
enhancing participation. 
Securities exchange 
Establishment of a securities exchange in a market for government 
securities enhances participation, since it provides an avenue for 
participation by investors with different time horizons not necessarily 
fixed to the maturity of the bond. Only fourteen out of the possible forty-
seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa have a securities exchange.123 
Even without examining the depth of trading in existing exchanges these 
figures show that the quantities are wanting. 
 
The exchange is also an effective way of regulating the market, 
particularly its role in intermediary regulation, together with the SRO, 
i.e. brokers, dealers and investment banks allowed to trade on the 
exchange. The better the exchanges effectively and prudently manage the 
role, the more the realisation of integration of the capital markets in the 
society; therefore widening the reach and depth of the market. With more 
                                                 
122  T Endo ‘Developing efficient market infrastructure and secondary market of government bonds in 
developing countries’ (2003) 
123  see http://www.economywatch.com/stock-markets-in-world/sub-saharan-africa.html (accessed on 
14/03/2007). 
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brokers not concentrated only in cities, the more the participation in the 
capital market’s operations.   
 
Enhancing efficiency and reliability through adoption of new technology, 
e.g. electronic trading systems (ETSs), and internet trading, is good for 
the market. However, new technologies work best in well founded 
markets where there are no constraints on either the supply or demand 
sides. The efficiency helps the investors in price discovery in real time; 
therefore the securities are well priced and the conclusion of a deal is not 
delayed.  
2.5.4. Developing Government Bonds – Macroeconomic 
Stability 
The stability of the macroeconomic conditions in a country is essential to 
building an efficient market and establishing the credibility of the 
government as an issuer of debt securities.124 Similarly, credible 
domestic currency, credible and stable government, and sound monetary 
policies, are some of the vital conditions that domestic and foreign 
investors will look for before purchasing government securities, especially 
medium and long term instruments.125
 
Inflation and interest rates usually move in tandem.126 When inflation is 
high, interest rates also go up, and thus the cost of funding. If a country 
has volatile inflation it does not only affect the cost of funds but also the 
maturities, since investors keep the period short so as to maintain the 
value of their investment through reinvestment every time interest rates 
change. Similarly, the types of government securities are limited, e.g. 
                                                 
124  See World Bank and IMF, ( n74); T Endo (n122). 
125  Ibid. 
126  KM Morris Stocks, bonds and Wall Street, wall street journal, guide to understanding money and investing 
(2004). 
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some instruments, like deep discount bonds, are not attractive to 
investors.127
 
The issue of Inflation Indexed Bonds128 is one of the ways that a country 
can use to mitigate the effects of inflation its attraction of investors to 
participate in its government securities market.  
 
A credible exchange rate regime is important, especially for governments 
seeking foreign investment in domestic government securities markets. 
To help ensure this, government polices on fiscal, monetary, capital 
account, and debt management, need to be viewed as sustainable and 
consistent by both local and foreign investors. If exchange rate regimes 
are perceived to be unsustainable, the exchange rate risk premium will 
rise rapidly, accompanied by the related costs of funds, and the inability 
of the government to raise funds beyond very short maturities. 129
2.6.0. Conclusions 
This chapter highlighted the various sources of funds for the developing 
countries. Concessional sources are preferred because they have no 
negative effects to the economies of the developing countries. However, 
concessional funds are subjected to the foreign policies of the donor 
countries and many conditions that are value reducing.  
 
The proposal to develop a government bond market is looked at as one of 
the ways sub-Saharan African governments can utilise to develop 
resilience to changing donor countries’ foreign policy, negative effects and 
                                                 
127 D Woodard, Treasury inflation protected securities, http://matualfunds.about.com/cs/bondfunds/a/ 
tips.htm (accessed on 04/04/2007). 
128  It is a bond that provides protection against inflation i.e. the principal is increased by the change of in 
inflation over a period and as the principal increases, the interest rate is applied to the increased 
amount. Ibid.  
129 See World Bank and IMF, ( n74); T Endo (n122). 
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venerability of their economies to such risks associated with foreign debt, 
and getting long-term capital to finance infrastructure development.    
 
It is envisaged that a government bond market, if it is well managed, 
would: 
I. Provide funding for government’s budgetary deficits; 
II. Reduce need for foreign currency financing which is potentially 
damaging, and avoid build-ups of foreign currency denominated 
debts; 
III. Strengthen the transmission and implementation of monetary 
policy, including the monetary targets or inflation objectives, 
through the open market operation (OMO); 
IV. Coupled with prudent debt management, could help governments 
reduce their exposure to interest rate, currency and other financial 
risks; 
V. In the long term it would reduce the debt service cost, if based on 
market forces;  
VI. Help change the financial system from a primary bank-oriented to a 
multilayered system, where capital markets can complement bank 
financing – also creating competition for banks, and therefore the 
introduction of new products at competitive prices; 
VII. Support the development of bond markets for the sub-national and 
corporate sectors. The relatively risk free assets provided by 
government bonds establish a reference for pricing sub-national and 
corporate bonds, commercial papers or any kind of private sector 
fixed income securities.  
 
However, the sub-Saharan African countries must establish a proper 
regulatory legal framework and a market infrastructure that favours 
development of a government bonds market. In this regard, the 
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government must be able and willing to protect and enforce property 
rights, encourage wider participation in the market through appropriate 
reform programs, licensing, regulations and supervision, and further 
broaden and diversify the investor base by opening the market to foreign 
investors. 
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-3- 
Utilising Private Sector Capital 
3.1.0. Introduction 
Competitive markets will generally tend to under-produce infrastructure 
services because they frequently provide public good. This means that 
benefits are shared across the community in such a way that those who 
do not wish to buy the service cannot be excluded from the benefits 
created by those who do. However, a purely public approach to 
infrastructure development is weighed down by problems that include 
government bureaucracy, political meddling and interference, lack of 
funds for new investments, and often poor management and 
maintenance of facilities.1
 
Economic liberals, on the other hand, think that the government should 
only do what cannot be done in the market.2 Seldon candidly puts it 
that,3
… government should act not where it is better than the market but only 
where there is no market … whenever it is used, government is so 
disappointing or worse – inefficient, unaccountable and corrupt – that it 
is best not to use it at all except for functions where all its faults have to 
be tolerated to obtain the services required. 
The anti-government sentiments withstanding, the history of the 
development of transport infrastructure has had a mixed fortune with 
                                                 
1  See SV Berg, et al. Private initiatives in infrastructure, (2002). Also RR Officer, ‘The respective roles of 
government and the private sector and public/private partnership’ presented in public private partnership 
forum, the accounting foundation, (2003).  
2  The market theory was propounded by Adam Smith in his book An inquirly into the nature and causes of 
the wealth of nations. 
3  Seldon A  Capitalism, (1990) p158. 
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periods dominated by private capital4 in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, followed by public financing5 for most of the twentieth 
century, and lately the development of the public private partnership 
(PPP).6 This history cannot be brushed aside, because it attests to 
various events in history. For example, the move from private financing 
of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries is marked by the major 
World Wars in the early twentieth century which had a major impact on 
infrastructure due to destruction during the war. This indicates that, the 
private sector capital is risk sensitive, particularly on infrastructure 
projects which tend to have longer pay-back and build-out periods.7       
 
PPP seeks to get the best of both approaches to infrastructure, employing 
private sector innovation and business acumen where appropriate, while 
allowing overall planning, coordination and regulatory control of the 
infrastructure networks to reside in public hands.  
 
Under a successful PPP the government or other end users are 
purchasers of the infrastructure services, e.g. where the public is 
charged tolls to use a road or the government pays shadow tolls to a 
private company for public usage of a road.  Therefore the government 
does not bear the risks that are inherent in the provision of the 
infrastructure (road), i.e. risks in the design, financing, construction, 
operation and maintenance of the road for the time of the PPP contract.  
 
                                                 
4  Reference can be made to Turnpikes which were in place in England as early as 1663 and in the USA in 
1792. A turnpike is a road partly or wholly paid for by fees collected from travellers at tollgates.   
5  During this period the private sector was also actively involved through tenders for construction, design, 
and maintenance. However, it is distinct because it was public sector driven.   
6  See D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, Public private partnerships: The worldwide revolution in infrastructure 
provision and project finance (2004) p41. 
7  This concept is also appreciated in R Sheppard et al, Financing infrastructure in Africa: how the region can 
attract more project finance, (World Bank public-private infrastructure advisory facility (PPIAF)) Gridlines 
Note   No. 13 (2006). 
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Since the study is about raising capital for infrastructure development, it 
will not look in detail at the various forms of PPPs, but at the legal and 
institutional frameworks in a country that would act as incentive for the 
private capital mobilisation and participation in transport infrastructure 
development. 
 
This Chapter looks at the organisation of PPPs with the aim of showing 
that the organisation itself is one of the determinants of private capital 
participation in project finance, risk allocation in a PPP contract to 
achieve value for money, and the legal and institutional framework in a 
country that would generally make a country attractive to private project 
capital. 
3.2.0. The organisation of PPPs  
A PPP organisational structure brings together a number of parties for an 
infrastructure investment in the form of a special purpose vehicle (SPV or 
Project Company) created specifically for the project.8 In an ideal 
situation participants in a PPP would include: 
I. The public sector procurer (the government, local governments and 
agencies, state-owned entities); 
II. The sponsors who as equity investors normally create a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV or project company) through which they 
contract with the public procurer, and principal subcontractors; 
III. Financiers; 
IV. Subcontractors; and 
V. Other involved parties such as advisers (legal, financial, technical), 
insurer, rating agencies, underwriters, etc. 
 
                                                 
8  See D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, (n6) p182. 
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3.2.1. Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)/ Project Company 
This is a separate legal entity, generally a company established to 
undertake the activity defined in a contract or tender. At this stage of the 
discussion it is important to note that for a country to attract investment 
package in the form of SPVs, the law must recognise such companies 
and maybe give some incentive.9 The institutions given the mandate to 
register companies must also be efficient, because SPVs are put together 
by the prospective investors a short while before tendering for an 
infrastructure project.10
 
The execution of a PPP contract generally depends on the type of PPP 
agreement that the parties have entered into. This may include, but is 
not limited to:11
Build, own, operate (BOO) – the developer is responsible for design, 
funding, construction, operation and maintenance of the 
infrastructure facility during the concession period, with no provision 
for transfer of ownership to the government. At the end of the 
concession period the original agreement may be renegotiated, a new 
agreement may be negotiated, or the facility may be purchased by the 
government. Operation refers to the provision of some or all of the 
services related to the facility’s use.  
Build, own, operate transfer (BOOT) – it is just like BOO but the 
ownership and the operating rights at the end of the concession period 
                                                 
9  See e.g. Kenyan Minister for Finance in the 2005 National Budget Speech “... Securitisation based on 
bankable assets and ability to generate cash has become a viable alternative in most emerging markets, 
particularly for institutions providing infrastructural services to raise long term capital. In this regard, 
[the Minister proposed] to exempt investment income of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) from income tax. 
This is to encourage institutions providing infrastructural services to set up SPVs for purposes of issuing 
asset backed securities”.  
10  ‘State to speed up registration of companies’, Business Daily 17 April 2007. In Kenya it takes about 300 
days to register a company, while in Botswana and South Africa it takes less than a month to complete 
the process. This story is also available on http://bdafrica.com (accessed 17/04/2007). 
11  See D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, ( n6) p6-8. 
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reverts to the government. The agreement is structured in such a way 
that the concessionaire will recoup investment and some operating 
profits during the time of the concession, and therefore the 
government has no obligation to compensate for the residue value of 
the facility. 
Build, operate, transfer (BOT) – the infrastructure facility is designed, 
financed, operated and maintained by the concessionaire for the 
period of the concession. Legal ownership of the facility may or may 
not rest with the concession company. 
Design, build, finance (DBF) – involves the procurement of an 
infrastructure facility using private finance, without private sector 
operation and provision of the associated services. 
Design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) – the service provider is 
responsible for the design, construction, financing and operation of the 
infrastructure facility.  
 
The PPP agreement is defined by the functions of the concessionaire in 
executing the agreement. Highly specialised activities are bundled 
together, such as finance, design, construction, operation and 
maintenance, which can only be serviced effectively through a 
consortium. This may consist of engineering and project management 
firms, construction companies, financial underwriters and operating 
enterprises who may participate as equity investors in the SPV. The SPV 
may also subcontract some of the activities.12
 
The formation of the separate legal entity is important for the following 
reasons. 
I. To allow lending to the project to be non-recourse to the sponsor by 
virtue of the limited liability nature of the SPV; 
                                                 
12  Ibid. 
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II. To enable assets and liabilities of the project not to appear on the 
sponsors’ balance sheet by virtue of no sponsor having a majority 
share holding in the SPV, and application of consolidation principles 
when preparing the group accounts;13 
III. For the benefits of the project lenders, to help to insulate the project 
from a potential bankruptcy of any of the sponsors (bankruptcy 
remoteness);14 and 
IV. For project rating purposes.15 
Financier-led approach 
This is a new approach developing in Australia16 where specialised 
investment banks take a more active role in managing the SPV. The bank 
takes up a hundred per cent of the equity in the SPV and manages the 
bidding process. Since the bank cannot perform all the specialised 
functions, it concludes contracts with other parties that come together to 
form a consortium (after the bidding process).  
                                                 
13  International Accounting Standard 27 (IAS 27) consolidated and separate financial statements available 
on http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias27.htm (accessed on 15/04/2007). In an amendment effected 
in 1998 SIC 12 addresses when a special purpose entity (SPE) should be consolidated by a reporting 
enterprise under the consolidation principles in IAS 27. Under SIC 12 an entity must consolidate a SPE 
when, in substance, the entity controls the SPE. The control of an SPE by an entity may be indicated if: 
the SPE conducts its activities to meet the entity's specific needs; The entity has decision-making powers 
to obtain the majority of the benefits of the SPE's activities; the entity is able to obtain the majority of the 
benefits of the SPE's activities through an 'auto-pilot' mechanism; by having a right to the majority of the 
SPE's benefits, the entity is exposed to the SPE's business risks; and the entity has the majority of 
residual interest in the SPE. See http://www.iasplus.com/interps/sic012.htm (accessed on 
15/04/2007). 
14  In case of  bankruptcy the receiving manager would take over the assets of the bankrupt company and 
its subsidiaries;  an SPV would not be affected since it is not a subsidiary of any of the sponsors. 
15  See  P Rigby et al., Criteria, Standard & Poor’s Criteria for Debt Rating (2001) … Project finance is 
supposed to be non-recourse to the sponsor. Some lender credit assessments are often based on the 
sponsor’s reputation, its creditworthiness, or both—the implication being that the sponsor will support 
the project in difficult times. However, particularly when the sponsor is rated higher than the project, if 
the sponsor suffers a rating downgrade, the rating of projects carried out in an SPV would not be 
affected.  
16  See D Grimsey, & MK (n6) p 234. 
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The model is interesting because, as noted in Chapter 2, for the 
foreseeable future in the developing world banks will continue to be the 
main vehicles through which savings are channelled into investments.17 
However, in countries like Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, where the 
Banking Acts prohibit banks from engaging in none core business it may 
limit the involvement of a significant section of private sector capital in 
infrastructure development. With regard to the Kenyan Banking Act,18 
banks are not allowed to 
… acquire or hold, directly or indirectly, any part of the share capital of, 
or otherwise have a beneficial interest in, any financial, commercial, 
agricultural, industrial or other undertaking where the value of the 
[bank’s] interest would exceed in the aggregate twenty five per cent of the 
core capital of the [bank].   
 
However, a proviso provides:19
A shareholding in a corporation established for the purposes of 
promoting development in Kenya and approved by the minister shall not 
be subject to the [foregoing provision]. 
It adds more bureaucracy to the process of establishing the SPV, by 
requiring the approval of the minister, and also as regards the time taken 
in registering a company.20 Taking into consideration that such 
companies are registered to take part in the bidding process, the extra 
bureaucracy does not help in attracting private sector capital in 
infrastructure development. 
3.3.0. Allocating Risks  
In a good PPP contract risks are well allocated, so that none of the 
parties bears an excessive amount of the risk. For example, when 
                                                 
17  A Harwood et al. The crisis in emerging financial markets: a World Bank Group -Brookings conference 
report (1999) available on www.brookings.edu (accessed on 25/11/2006). 
18  Banking Act (Cap 488) Laws of Kenya section 12(b). 
19  Banking Act (Cap 488) Laws of Kenya section 12(b)(ii). 
20  The time taken to register a company in Kenya  is 300 days see (n10). 
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activities are bundled together and contracted out to a single private 
party through an SPV, from a government’s point of view, risk transfer is 
most effective if there is a ‘whole of life cycle’ contract with a single 
private party.21 This reduces the burden on the part of the government to 
enter into many contracts with different parties, and the logistics of 
policing them. 
 
On the other hand, private parties take on risk if that risk can be 
appropriately priced, managed and mitigated, which involves transferring 
that risk to third parties by way of subcontracting or insurance.22 If the 
risk is one that carries a significant probability of interrupting or 
diminishing the returns to the project company, a significant premium 
may be demanded to assume that particular risk. This in turn increases 
the cost of financing the project, and the price paid by the government or 
other end users.  
 
Because risk is priced by the market, value for money is improved by the 
transfer of appropriate risk, as the project company is able to reduce 
either the probability that the risk will occur, the financial consequences 
if it does eventuate, or both. There comes a point, however, when this 
transfer becomes sub-optimal. If risks that in fact cannot be best 
managed by the private sector continue to be transferred to the project 
company, value for money will decline since the premium demanded by 
the private sector will outweigh the benefits to the public procurer.23 
Therefore, optimum rather than maximum risk transfer is the objective 
of the PPP arrangement.   
                                                 
21  See D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, (n6) p 80. 
22  See risk management on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_management (accessed on the 15/04/2007). 
see also K Kwaku Managing political risk in project financing (talking notes). 
23  Ibid. See also D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, (n6) p 80. 
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3.3.1. Mitigating Risks 
The private sector, by investing in a developing country’s infrastructure, 
is exposed to various risks. While some of the risks are market related 
and can best be handled in the market, e.g. exchange rate risks since, 
the mode of income for the project is the local currency, others like 
expropriation risks, political risks, regulatory risks, including adverse 
changes in the law to affect the operation or income of the infrastructure 
project, can only be mitigated by involvement of the government. 
 
Road transport infrastructure may also be affected by some other 
peculiar risks, such as cash flow risks. Apparently this should be a 
market related risk and should be taken care of by the project company 
through the market. However, the nature and importance of transport 
infrastructure, where too many charges would have a trickle effect on the 
whole of the economy through an increase in the cost of transport (hence 
reducing competitiveness of the country’s products in the international 
market (refer to Chapter 1)) and the fact that alternative routes could be 
used by road users to beat the road user charges,24 means that these 
risks should be mitigated by the government as well. 
 
There are various methods which could be used to mitigate the 
mentioned risks since they cannot be well assessed and priced in the 
market. These would include government guarantees, multilateral 
development bank guarantees, and the multilateral investment 
guarantee agency (MIGA) insurance. 
Government Guarantees 
National government may provide guarantees to the investors in a SPV 
and the lenders (such as the banks and other debt holders) against 
                                                 
24  See lessons from Melbourne City Link, discussed in D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, (n6) p 37.   
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certain policy risks25 by minimum or threshold revenue guarantees to 
provide reassurance to bankers and other debt holders (without 
increasing public sector risks),26 special taxation provisions27 etc. 
  
Figure 3.0: Government Guarantee28
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By the government providing a guarantee to the SPV, as illustrated in 
figure 3.0, it assures the investors and the parties with whom the SPV 
has subcontracted that the SPV will be able to meet its obligations due to 
the assured liquidity. This lowers the cost of the project financing and 
thus the cost of the project.   
Multilateral Development Bank Guarantees 
Multilateral development banks (MDB(s)) such as the IBRD, IDA and 
AfDB offer guarantee facilities. The MDBs’ long term relationship with a 
host country for infrastructural investment acts as an extra incentive for 
                                                 
25  Adverse change of law and or expropriation. A country should have Investment protection laws see e.g. 
Kenya; Foreign Investments Protection Act (Cap 518) Laws of Kenya. 
26  Offering a revenue guarantee should not become a hindrance to development of good market based 
incentives to increase revenue for the project company. 
27  Kenya Minister of Finance National Budget Speech (n9). 
28  Source: Author’s understanding of government guarantee. 
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government to perform its part of the contract, since if it defaults, and 
the guarantee is called upon and paid out, the member country 
concerned is obliged to repay the MDB concerned. If the concerned 
country fails to do so in accordance with the agreed terms, the MDB can 
withhold other facilities provided to that country by the MDB.29  
 
The partial risk guarantees (PRGs) offered by the MDBs could be used in 
addressing sovereign risks30 faced by private sector infrastructure 
providers. By covering specific obligations of the government to a 
privately sponsored project, PRGs ensure payment, in the case of default, 
of a guaranteed loss resulting from non-performance of such obligations 
by the government. The MDB would then call on the counter guarantee 
that the country gave to the MDB. 
 
PRGs are relevant where there is a high risk of policy reversal and where 
the counter guarantee and involvement of the Banks are critical in 
securing, improving the terms of, or catalyzing, long term private 
financing that is required to finance infrastructure project.31 The 
availability of these facilities may be cited in the bidding documents as 
an option, so that bidders may reflect such availability in their bid price.  
 
The MDB’s guarantee (as illustrated in Figure 3.1) can benefit the host 
government and the project company as a borrower in several ways:32  
I. By covering risk that the market cannot assume, the guarantee can 
facilitate access to financing that would not otherwise be available 
for certain projects, thus making them possible. 
                                                 
29  See, World Bank, The World Bank guarantee: leveraging private finance for emerging markets (2002). 
30  Sovereign risks are risks that are attached to the dealing with a sovereign. 
31  Ibid. 
32  World Bank, World Bank Guarantee handbook (1997). 
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II. The guarantee can extend the maturity of loans beyond the loan 
period that would be possible without the guarantee, thereby 
allowing for a lower unit cost of output over the life of the project. 
III. The guarantees provide borrowers (public and private) with greater 
flexibility in choosing the most appropriate financing sources 
(currencies, markets, interest rates benchmarks etc.) for their 
needs. 
IV. For host governments, PRGs can reduce their exposure to a project 
by passing commercial risks to the private sector 
V. For commercial bank lenders, PRGs may obviate the need to make 
provision for ‘country risk’ as required by their regulator. 
VI. Participation of the MDBs also gives the ‘seal of approval’ to the 
projects concerned because of the additional monitoring and project 
evaluation.33 
Figure 3.1: Multilateral Banks Guarantee34
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33  See, D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, (n6) p 230. 
34  P, Benoit, Mitigating project risks: World Bank support for government guarantees, Public policy for the 
private sector (1996). 
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Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insurance 
As a member of the World Bank Group, MIGA's mission is to promote 
FDI into developing countries, to help support economic growth, reduce 
poverty, and improve people's lives.35 MIGA strives to achieve its 
objectives through insuring foreign and local investment36 against 
political or non-commercial risks; mediating disputes between investors 
and governments; and advising governments on attracting investment.37
 
MIGA will be looked at in connection with its role in insuring investors 
against political or non-commercial risks for which it’s best known. With 
Africa’s risk prevalence being perceived to be higher than in other parts 
of the world,38 risk insurance for investors is a safe bet. MIGA covers the 
following risks: currency inconvertibility and transfer restriction, 
expropriation, war and civil disturbance, and breach of contract.39
 
Transfer restriction cover protects against losses arising from an 
investor's inability to convert local currency (capital, interest, principal, 
profits, royalties, or other monetary benefits) into foreign exchange for 
transfer outside the host country. The cover also insures against 
excessive delays in acquiring foreign exchange caused by the host 
government's actions or failure to act. Currency devaluation is not 
covered. 
 
Expropriation cover offers protection against loss of the insured 
investment as a result of acts by the host government that may reduce or 
                                                 
35  See about MIGA on http://www.miga.org/sitelevel2/level2.cfm?id=1069 (accessed on 16/04/2007). 
36  Eligible investors include nationals of any MIGA member country, provided they are not nationals of the 
country where the investment is being made. Under certain conditions, however, investments made by 
nationals of the host country may also be eligible. 
37  See http://www.miga.org (accessed on 16/04/2007). 
38  K Kwaku Managing political risk in project financing(talking notes). 
39  See http://www.miga.org/sitelevel2/level2.cfm?id=1058 (accessed on 16/04/2007). 
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eliminate ownership of, control over, or rights to the insured investment. 
This policy also covers partial losses, as well as "creeping expropriation," 
a series of acts that over time have an expropriatory effect. Bona fide, 
non-discriminatory measures taken by the host government in the 
exercise of its legitimate regulatory authority are not considered 
expropriatory. 
 
War and civil disturbance cover protects against loss due to the 
destruction of, disappearance of, or physical damage to, tangible assets 
caused by politically motivated acts of war or civil disturbance, including 
revolution, insurrection, and coups d'état. Terrorism and sabotage are 
also covered. War and civil disturbance cover also extends to events that 
result in the total inability of the project enterprise to conduct operations 
essential to its overall financial viability. 
 
Breach of contract cover protects against losses arising from the host 
government's breach or repudiation of a contractual agreement with the 
investor. In the event of such an alleged breach or repudiation, the 
investor must be able to invoke a dispute resolution mechanism (e.g., 
arbitration) set out in the underlying contract, and obtain an award for 
damages. The investor may file a claim if, after a specified period of time, 
payment is not received. 
 
MIGA’s insurance does not only provide assurance of payment in case of 
loss, but also benefits investors and lenders in several other ways:40
I. MIGA’s relationship with shareholder governments provides 
additional leverage in protecting investments thereby deterring 
harmful actions. 
                                                 
40  Ibid. 
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II. MIGA intervenes at the first sign of trouble to resolve potential 
investment disputes before they reach claim status, helping to 
maintain investments and keep revenues flowing, and thus being a 
mediator in disputes. 
III. MIGA’s insurance acts as a guarantee that helps lower borrowing 
costs through reducing risk-capital ratings of projects. Similarly, it 
helps investors obtain project finance from banks. 
IV. Through providing insurance cover for up to 15 years (in some cases 
20), MIGA increases the tenor of loans available to investors, 
allowing for a lower unit cost of output over the life of the project. 
 
MIGA’s insurance is broad, and could cover new41 cross-border 
investments originating in any MIGA member country destined for any 
developing member country.  Types of foreign investments that can be 
covered include equity, shareholder loans, and shareholder loan 
guaranties, provided the loans have a minimum maturity of three years. 
Loans to unrelated borrowers can be insured, provided a shareholder 
investment in the project is insured concurrently or has already been 
insured. Other forms of investment, such as technical assistance and 
management contracts, and franchising and licensing agreements, may 
also be eligible for cover.42
3.4.0. Legal and Institutional Framework 
In Chapter 2 this study looked at the legal and institutional framework 
with regard to availability of laws on the statute books. This section looks 
at the legal and institutional framework with regard to enforcement. La 
                                                 
41  New investments are those that have neither been made nor irrevocably committed by the time the 
investor submits a preliminary application for a guarantee to MIGA. Other investments may also be 
eligible and are considered on a case-by-case basis. 
42  See http://www.miga.org (n39). 
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Porta et al43 assert that a good legal environment protects the potential 
financier (investor) against expropriation, thereby raising their 
willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities. This assertion 
holds water even when viewed not only from a securities’ market point of 
view. Legally, securities are property, and what matters is sanctity of 
property derived from the law.  
 
Beim and Calomiris44 argue that there is more to law than just the 
existence of the law on the books. They say: “[e]very country has some 
kind of laws on the books, but not every country is said to live under the 
rule of law.” They single out corruption and judicial inefficiency as some 
of the hindrances with regard to enforcement of the laws. This section 
looks at these two factors (corruption and judicial inefficiency) as one, 
because judicial inefficiency can be an antecedent of corruption. It 
further looks at other investor friendly methods of solving investor 
disputes.  
3.4.1. Corruption and Judicial Inefficiency 
Beim and Calomiris, while talking about incidences of corruption, aptly 
put it that,45
… [if] judges, police and government officials can be bribed to favour 
some person or company. [ … ] Almost by definition, a bribed judge or 
policeman or other public official will do something unfair – that is, 
contrary to what an impartial agent would have done under whatever law 
prevail.  
Therefore, corruption produces negative effects with regard to investment 
regardless of good policies and laws on the books.  
 
                                                 
43  R, La Porta et al. Legal determinates of  external finance, NBER working paper series, Working Paper 5879 
(1997). 
44  DO, Beim & CW, Calomiris, Emerging financial markets: (2001) p154.  
45  Ibid. 
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Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is widespread, but measuring its 
extent is inherently challenging. The World Bank Institute (WBI)46 and 
Transparency International (TI)47 publish indexes that attempt to 
measure perceptions of corruption across a large number of countries.  
 
The WBI and TI indexes rank many sub-Saharan African nations among 
the most corrupt worldwide; however, both indexes assess perceptions 
rather than actual incidences of corruption, and both institutions 
recognize that these indexes are imprecise. That not withstanding, the 
situation in the sub-Saharan Africa region is complicated, as TI 
asserts:48   
… a history of autocratic and unaccountable government, as well as 
conflict and crisis throughout the continent have posed particular 
challenges to governance and the fight against corruption in Africa to the 
point that several countries have become virtually synonymous with 
graft.  
This is appalling, particularly when research results continue to show 
that corruption has a significant impact on economic growth, and that 
the most affected are capital investments.49  
World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
Our study presents some statistics collected by the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC’s) World Business Environment Survey (WBES)50 on 
                                                 
46  See Governance and Anticorruption on http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWB 
IGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20708444~menuPK:1928447~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSite
PK:1740530,00.html (accessed on 13/04/2007). WBI produced its first corruption index in 1996 and 
updates it every two years. 
47  See about TI on http://www.transparency.org/contact_us/work (accessed on 13/04/2007). TI first 
published its Corruption Perception Index in 1995 and updates it annually. 
48  See http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/africa_middle_east/about/africa accessed on 
(13/04/2007). 
49  W, Shang-Jin, How taxing is corruption on international investors? (1997) NBER Working Paper no. 6030 
National Bureau of Economic Research;  and M, Paolo, Corruption and growth, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (1995) p110. 
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the basis of some responses from 1,629 businesses in 16 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. (Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The purpose of the 
survey was to better understand constraints that hinder private business 
development in the region.  
 
In this study questions relevant to corruption were examined. In the 
analysis an extra column is provided to show the average global 
perception. 
 
1. How problematic has corruption been for the operation and growth of 
your business? Figure 3.2 presents an analysis of responses of 
‘moderate obstacle’ or ‘major obstacle’. 
 
Figure 3.2: moderate or major obstacles 51
 
                                                                                                                                                 
50  See WBES on http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/IC-wbes (accessed on 17/04/2007). 
51  Adapted from The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) Report to the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04506.pdf 
(accessed on 17/04/2007). 
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Notes: Options for the responses were: no obstacles, minor obstacles, 
moderate obstacles and major obstacles.  
Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms that 
responded in each country.  
2. Do firms like yours often need to make extra unofficial payments to 
gain government contracts? The range of answers presented in Figure 
3.3 is ‘Always,’ ‘Usually’ or ‘Frequently’ 
Figure 3.3: Always, Usually or Frequently52
 
Notes: Options for the responses were: always, usually, frequently, 
sometimes, seldom, and never. 
Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms that responded 
in each country.  
The final question that is looked at with regard to this survey is- 
3. How often do you associate ‘honest/un-corrupt’ as description of the 
court system in resolving business disputes? Figure 3.4 gives the 
analysis of those who responded ‘Never,’ ‘Seldom,’ or ‘Sometimes’. 
 
                                                 
52  Ibid. 
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Figure 3.4: Never, Seldom, or Sometimes53
 
Notes: Options for the responses were: always, usually, frequently, 
sometimes, seldom, and never. 
Figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms that responded 
in each country 
 
This survey confirms three fundamental things with regard to this study:  
I. That corruption is indeed a great hindrance to private capital 
utilisation, as illustrated by responses from business people in the 
region that corruption is a moderate to a major obstacle to their 
business growth; 
II. That corruption has significantly eroded the confidence that 
business people have in the courts as neutral arbiters in disputes; 
and 
III. That the region, relative to the world average, is ravaged by 
corruption, particularly official corruption, which is like an 
unofficial tax that increases the cost of doing business.54 
                                                 
53  See United States General Accounting Office (n50). 
54  see W, Shang-Jin &  M, Paolo (n49). 
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3.4.2. Dispute Resolution 
Watter Mattli55 argues that the various fora for dispute resolution and 
their procedures are understood to be an indirect product of rational 
selection, where actors select those institution that are most effective and 
appropriate for given disputes. 
 
Private parties have an overwhelming choice of fora, procedures, and 
methods of dispute resolution that range from litigation in national 
courts, and in rare occasions in international courts,56 to arbitration, 
mediation and conciliation.  
 
Litigation in national courts (as discussed in the previous section) is 
clouded by corruption perception in most sub-Saharan African countries, 
and would not offer an investor friendly dispute resolution. Litigation in 
international courts is very limited, and, therefore, it may not have a 
significant impact in the region;57 currently only the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Court accepts such disputes 
originating from its member states. Mediation and conciliation are non-
binding. This section therefore looks at arbitration as a method of 
settlement of commercial58 and investment disputes.   
                                                 
55  W Mattli, ‘Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration’, International Organisation 
(2001)55 p 919-947. Also available on http://journals.cambridge/ downloads (accessed on 17/02/2007) 
56  Very few international courts have their jurisdiction extended to deal with international disputes of 
private parties. These include, European Court of Justice, COMESA Court; and may be soon the East 
African Court of Justice under the proposed extended jurisdiction.  
57  21 out of the 47 countries in sub-Sahara  Africa are members of COMESA, but the court has also 
registered very few cases.   
58  Covers activities such as: sale of goods, distribution agreements, commercial representation or agency, 
leasing, consultancy, transportation, construction work, joint ventures, investment, financing, insurance, 
exploitation agreements or concession and other forms of industrial business cooperation – United 
Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, Article 1(1). 
 67
Arbitration 
Arbitration is a private method of dispute resolution chosen by parties 
themselves as an effective way of putting an end to a dispute, without 
recourse to courts of law.59 Parties may refer their disputes to ad hoc 
arbitration (conducted pursuant to rules agreed by the parties 
themselves or laid down by the arbitral tribunal) or institutional 
arbitration (administered by a specialist arbitral institution under its own 
rules of arbitration).60
 
Arbitration offers a number of advantages over litigation as a means to 
resolve disputes, including: 
I. Speedy resolution of disputes by a neutral forum chosen by the 
parties. 
II. Involvement of experts in the resolution of a dispute, particularly 
where the dispute requires specialised expertise. 
III. International enforceability: international treaties that govern the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (such as the New 
York Convention61) have much greater acceptance internationally, 
than treaties for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments of courts 
of law. 
IV. Privacy and confidentiality: parties must consent to the publication 
of their disputes; this offers privacy and confidentiality, unlike 
litigation where the judgments are reported and the proceeding 
could be a constant news item. 
V. Continued relationship: parties to arbitration would more often than 
not have a continued relationship after the dispute, due to its 
                                                 
59  A Redfern et al. Law and practice of international commercial arbitration (2004) p1 “The award is binding 
amongst the parties unless successfully challenged in a court of law or reviewed by the arbitral tribunal”. 
60  See A Redfern et al (n59). 
61  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, on 10 
June 1958. 
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conciliatory nature. This would be an added advantage in a working 
environment where parties work in a consortium.  
 
Nonetheless, the practice of resolving disputes by arbitration only works 
because it is held in place by a complex system of national laws and 
international treaties.62 In the words of Lord Mustill:63 “it is now firmly 
established that more than one national system of law may bear upon an 
international arbitration.” Therefore, for a country to lure investors 
through easing the methods of dispute resolution, it must be prepared to 
pass laws that govern recognition and enforcement of the agreement to 
arbitrate, and the recognition and enforcement of the awards of the 
arbitral tribunal.  
 
In most cases arbitration takes place in a neutral seat which may be in a 
third country, particularly where it involves foreign investments. A 
country should also consider being a member of the 1958 - Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention).64  
 
International Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention65) 
The ICSID Convention came into force in 1966. It is administered by the 
World Bank Group under the International Centre for Settlement of 
                                                 
62  As we will see, the support of international treaties such as the New York Convention of 1958 on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards, is essential to the effectiveness of arbitration 
internationally. 
63  Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] A.C. 334 at 357. 
64  The Convention is widely recognized as a foundation instrument of international arbitration. It requires 
courts of contracting States to give effect to an agreement to arbitrate when seized of a matter covered by 
an arbitration agreement, and also to recognize and enforce awards made in other States, subject to 
specific limited exceptions. The Convention entered into force on 7 June 1959. see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html (accessed on 
20/04/2007). 
65  It may also be referred to as the Washington Convention. 
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Investment Disputes (ICSID).66 This Convention is discussed because of 
the new grounds it has established for the settlement of investment 
disputes, and its ability to facilitate increased flows of international 
investments.67
 
Prior to the ICSID Convention disputes that involved foreign nationals 
and host states could only be taken to a court of law with the express 
waiver of a state’s sovereign immunity.68 Therefore, if foreign private 
investors got into a dispute with the host government, they would have to 
ask their own government to take up their case at an inter-state level: 
diplomatic protection.69 The ICSID Convention broke new ground by 
giving both private individuals and corporations who were investors in a 
foreign state the right to bring legal proceeding against that state in their 
own name and on their own behalf before an international arbitral 
tribunal.70 In the words of Sir Elihu Lauterpacht:71
…for the first time a system was instituted under which non-state 
entities – corporations or individuals – could sue states directly; in which 
state immunity was much restricted; under which international law 
could be applied directly to the relationship between the investor and the 
host state …   
 
Because ICSID arbitration is governed by an international treaty, it is 
delocalised, or denationalised. By this I mean that national law is 
excluded from any control of any ICSID arbitration. The provisions in the 
Convention regarding challenge to, recognition of, and enforcement of 
ICSID awards can attest to this fact. Article 53 of the ICSID Convention 
                                                 
66  See http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (accessed on 20/04/2007). 
67  Ibid. 
68  see A Redfern et al. Law (n59) p 549. 
69  Prior to ICSID, international tribunal were open only to states. 
70  ICSID Convention Art. 25, Jurisdiction of the Centre.  
71  Sir Elihu Lauterpacht in his foreword to Christoph Schreur, The ICSID Convention: a commentary (2001) 
p xi-xii.    
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provides that the award of ICSID arbitrators is binding on the parties 
and not subject to any appeal or any other remedy, except those provided 
by the Convention itself. These remedies include: interpretation of the 
meaning or scope of the award;72 revision on the ground of discovery of a 
previous unknown fact of decisive importance;73 and annulment by an 
ad hoc committee.74
 
In concluding this section I would like to underscore the fact that 
national legal systems are very important to the success of arbitral 
processes. With the exception of ICSID arbitration, parties to arbitration 
may find themselves falling back on the courts for interim measures, and 
often for enforcement of an arbitral award. Therefore, the sub-Saharan 
African countries cannot escape the fact that something urgent needs to 
be done to improve the corruption and inefficiency perceptions of the 
court process in their countries.  
3.5.0. Conclusions 
The discussions in Chapter 2 were centred on the ways the government 
can raise more money at least cost for infrastructure development. 
However, Chapter 3 brings in the concept of private sector since the 
government even with the money must at the very least engage private 
companies for construction of the infrastructure.  
 
Minimising risks for both the government and the private sector should 
be a priority in achieving low cost project financing and value for money 
for the government. In achieving value for money the government must 
ensure that the risk transferred to the private entity is not optimal, but 
appropriate in a way that the best placed party to bear the risk should 
                                                 
72  ICSID Convention Art. 50. 
73  ICSID Convention Art. 51. 
74  ICSID Convention Art. 52. 
 71
bear the risk at minimum cost. Mitigating risk which cannot be well 
priced by the market is also another way of reducing the cost of capital 
through: government guarantees, multilateral development bank 
guarantees, and the multilateral investment guarantee agency (MIGA) 
insurance. 
 
The benefits flowing from proper risk allocation and mitigation by way of 
guarantees and insurance would include: 
I. By covering risk that the market cannot assume, the guarantee/ 
insurance can facilitate access to financing that would not otherwise 
be available for certain projects, thus making them possible. 
II. The guarantees/ insurance can extend the maturity of loans for a 
longer loan period that would otherwise not be possible without the 
guarantee, thereby allowing for a lower unit cost of output over the 
life of the project. 
III. The guarantees/ insurance provide borrowers (public and private) 
with greater flexibility in choosing the most appropriate financing 
sources (currencies, markets, interest rates benchmarks etc.) for 
their needs. 
 
Similarly, the private sector is very wary of disputes, particularly if the 
disputes are not likely to be fairly determined or the system is so 
inefficient as to cause unwarranted delay. Corruption is one of the 
hindrances in sub-Saharan Africa to fair adjudication of disputes, and 
inefficiencies in the court process.  
 
Alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration, in which 
parties have more faith should be embraced. In this regard, countries in 
the sub-Saharan Africa region would need to enact laws that govern 
recognition and enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate, and the 
recognition and enforcement of the awards of the arbitral tribunal. For 
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wider recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards countries in sub-
Saharan Africa should assent to international conventions, such as the 
New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. 
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-4- 
Need for Innovative Financing: Case of Kenya 
Road Maintenance Levy Fund 
4.1.0. Background 
The development and maintenance policies of the Kenyan road 
infrastructure have a pre-independence background. Having been a 
British colony which had been earmarked for settlement, she benefited 
from some British policies with regard to the development of her 
infrastructure.1
 
Roads and road transport are very important to the Kenyan economy. 
Therefore the Government of Kenya (GoK), from independence in 1963, 
embarked on a process of formulating and implementing many policies 
for rapid economic growth and development, which, in one way or 
another provided direction to the development, maintenance and repair 
of the road network.2 The attention that the GoK gave and continues to 
give to the development of the road infrastructure attests to the 
importance of roads and road transport in Kenya. Table 4.0 attempts to 
show the central stage that road transport plays, by indicating the levels 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Nyangito, HO, and Kimenye LN Agricultural development policies in Kenya, 1963–95. (1999) that; 
“attempts to address the rural development problem during the closing years of colonial administration 
[were] published in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 as a blueprint for modernizing agriculture in African 
reserves”.  
2  See e.g. RoK (Republic of Kenya). 1964. First National Development Plan 1964–1970.; 1970. Second 
National Development Plan 1970–1974. 1974. Third National Development Plan, 1974–1978.; 1983. Fifth 
National Development Plan, 1984–1988.;  1984. National Transport Plan 1984.; 1988. Sixth National 
Development Plan 1989–1993.; 1993. Seventh National Development Plan 1994–1996.; 1997. Eighth 
National Development Plan 1997–2001. etc.   
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of output by various modes of transport in the country from 1975 to 
1998. 
Table 4.0: Kenya transport service sector (Output in K₤ millions)3
Transport type 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Road 35.8 (24.4) 92.3 (33.1) 248.8 (45.1) 476.9 (44.3) 810.7 (36.3) 870.7 (33.7) 
Railway 25.4 (17.3) 32.9 (11.8) 57.7 (10.5) 94.5 (8.8) 225.0 (10.1) 187.4 (7.3) 
Water 34.5 (23.6) 62.7 (22.5) 89.2 (16.2) 134.2 (12.5) 372.3 (16.7) 408.6 (15.8) 
Air 39.9 (27.2) 41.6 (14.9) 86.8 (15.8) 268.2 (24.9) 471.1 (21.1) 650.5 (25.2) 
Pipeline – 18.6 (6.7) 23.4 (4.2) 31.1 (2.9) 197.8 (8.9) 278.0 (10.8) 
Incidental 
services 10.9 (7.4) 31.2 (11.2) 45.2 (8.2) 72.7 (6.7) 153.8 (6.9) 186.7 (7.2) 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the share of each service 
in the transport sector output. 
 
Financing strategies for the development, maintenance and repair of the 
road network have also had a life of their own. Over the years the focus 
on various modes of financing strategies has significantly changed. 
However, the status of the road network has continued to deteriorate. 
The World Bank in one of its reports says:4  
The primary problem with the Kenya road sector is not the quantity but 
the quality of the network. This is the consequence of two rather different 
factors 
• Conditions on most paved and unpaved roads have deteriorated 
significantly through a lack of maintenance and, on the main 
paved network, the overloading of vehicles 
• Traffic growth has resulted in a substantial network of unpaved 
roads carrying traffic levels that would justify paving the roads: 
about 2,500 km of unpaved roads carry over 200 vehicles per day.  
 
                                                 
3  Wasike, WSK Road infrastructure policies in Kenya: Historical trends and current challenges, KIPPRA 
Working Paper No. 1 (2001). 
4  World Bank. ‘Staff appraisal report: Kenya: Nairobi–Mombasa Road Rehabilitation Project.’ Report No. 
13798-KE. (1995). 
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Though the problems identified with regard to the Kenyan road sector 
infrastructure are not just related to financing, this study looks at only 
the financing aspect in line with its focus on access to capital for 
developing countries. This section looks at possible innovative methods 
of financing the road sector in Kenya within the existing legal and 
institutional framework. It starts by giving the background to the 
development of the existing institutional framework, then examines the 
development of the financing strategy and finally discusses innovative 
financing methods. 
4.2.0. Road Institutions and Road Classification in Kenya  
Kenyan roads are broadly categorised according to the authority 
primarily responsible for their management. They are categorised as 
national, district, urban and special purpose roads. 5
 
National roads are the main highways of the classified road network, 
comprising Class A, B, and C roads, and are managed by the Roads 
Department of the Ministry of Roads and Public Works (MoR&PW). These 
roads provide for mobility in a national context, and the traffic on these 
roads is usually associated with longer travel distances.  
 
Further classification of national roads is based on the functions of a 
certain road as defined below, 
Class A - these are international trunk roads linking international 
boundaries or terminating at international ports. 
Class B - these are national trunk roads linking provincial headquarters 
and centres of national importance. 
Class C - these are primary roads linking district headquarters to each 
other or to higher class roads  
                                                 
5  Classification can be accessed on the  Kenya Roads Board website on http://www.krb.go.ke/ 
Classification.php (accessed on 25/044/2007). 
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 District roads comprise Classes D and E, and other unclassified rural 
roads (excluding urban roads6), and are managed by the District Roads 
Committees (DRCs). They primarily serve local traffic. The further 
classification of district roads is based on their functions, as defined 
below, 
Class D - Secondary roads linking locally important centres to each other 
or to higher class roads. 
Class E - Minor roads linking minor centres. 
 
The other unclassified rural roads are managed by either DRCs or 
County Councils. 
 
Special purpose roads or Class F, include roads for tourist, township, or 
agriculture purposes; any roads used for strategic purposes, such as 
roads falling within national parks, game reserves and forests; security 
roads; and  roads in areas producing certain agricultural commodities, 
like tea, coffee sugar etc. special purpose roads are managed by various 
government agencies, such as: Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), under the 
Ministry of Tourism; Forest Department under the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources; coffee, tea, and sugar boards etc, 
all falling under the Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
The disjointed nature of the institutional framework for the roads sector 
may have been a factor in the sector’s poor performance in maintaining 
the network.7 A study by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)8 also saw 
this as the principal reason for the poor performance of the entire road 
                                                 
6  Urban roads are those falling within the urban areas and administered by City, Municipal and Town 
Councils. 
7  Wasike, WSK (2001) (n3). 
8  IEA  Our problems our solutions: An economic and public policy agenda for Kenya. (1998). 
 77
transport sector, since it is difficult to coordinate the activities of the 
various road agencies, to determine their financial requirements, and to 
address the problems of the road sector in a synchronised manner. 
4.2.1. Kenya Roads Board (KRB) an Institutional Framework 
In 1999 the GoK, in a bid to improve the management of and the 
institutional framework for roads, tabled the Kenya Roads Board Act9 in 
Parliament. The objective was to develop an institutional framework 
within which the management of the entire road network could most 
effectively be undertaken.10 The Act provides for the establishment of the 
Kenya Roads Board (KRB) which is composed of major stakeholders in 
the roads sector (who constitute the majority of its membership) and 
representatives of relevant government ministries or departments.11
 
The Act outlines the major tasks of the KRB as follows:12
• To coordinate implementation of all policies relating to the 
maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the road network 
• To coordinate maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the 
road network with a view to achieving efficiency, cost-effectiveness 
and safety 
• To administer funds derived from the fuel levy and any other funds 
that may accrue to the board 
• To determine the financial allocations for road agencies and 
evaluate the delivery of works through technical, financial and 
performance audits 
                                                 
9  The Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999  
10  Attorney-General’s notes to The Kenya Roads Board Act, No. 7 of 1999. 
11  The stakeholders include the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Kenya National 
Farmers’ Union, the Automobile Association of Kenya, road contractors, road transporters, and the Kenya 
Association of Tour Operators. The government is represented by the Ministry of Transport, Information 
and Communications (MoITC), the Ministry of Roads and Public Works (MoRPW), the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, and the Ministry of Local Government.. (Kenya Roads Board Act, Sec 7 and schedule 1). 
12  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 6.  
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• To ensure that all procurement of works is conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines and criteria set by the board 
• To recommend to the Minister responsible for roads the areas for 
study and research; the specifications, design standards and 
classification for roads; vehicle types and dimensions; axle-load 
limits; and road safety measures 
 
In essence the KRB provides an institutional framework within which the 
entire road network is managed, and is entrusted with the authority to 
efficiently use its funds to develop, rehabilitate and maintain the road 
network.  
 
Having the institutional framework within one institution at least solves 
the problems of disjointed institutional framework envisaged by Wasike 
and IEA.13 However, the issue of adequacy of funds has been a big 
problem. The Minister responsible for transport, at a workshop held in 
September 2006, disclosed that14 the government needed Kshs 100 
billion (approximately US$1.45 billion; exchange rate US$1- Kshs 69) to 
reconstruct poor sections of the country’s poor road network and a 
further Kshs 12 billion (approximately US$ 174 million) each year for 
maintenance.  
4.3.0. Financing Strategies for the Kenyan Road Network 
In the 1960s and 1970s the policy of decentralised road delivery was 
operationalised through assigning county councils the responsibility for 
collecting cess15 from the sale of agricultural products, and road tolls on 
major highways.16 The money, buttressed by donor funding, was used to 
                                                 
13  Wasike, WSK (2001) (n3). 
14  ‘State requires Sh100b to upgrade road network’ The East African Standard, September 19, 2006. 
15  Cess is a tax levied on agricultural products by the local governments. 
16  Wasike, WSK (2001) (n3). 
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improve communication and transportation in the rural areas. However, 
waning donor interest, due to their dissatisfaction with the government’s 
procurement and accounting procedures, saw the reduction of donor 
funds, and the various programmes17 for improving access to rural areas 
grinding to a halt.18
 
In 1984 the GoK enacted the Public Roads Toll Act19 to provide for the 
collection of tolls on public roads; to establish a Public Roads Toll Fund; 
and for connected purposes.20 Moneys collected as tolls were to be paid 
into the Public Roads Toll Fund which was managed by the Ministry 
responsible for roads.21  However, the tolls were not very effective due to 
the way the government implemented the system, and were prone to 
corruption.  
 
In 1993 the government scrapped tolls on the road network (leaving a 
transit toll for international traffic) and implemented the collection of the 
road maintenance funds through a petroleum fuel levy. In this regard the 
Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act22 was enacted to provide for the 
imposition of a road maintenance levy on petroleum fuels; for the 
establishment and administration of a Road Maintenance Levy Fund 
(RMLF); and for connected purposes.23 The Act provides that the RMLF 
shall consist of the proceeds from the levy and the transit tolls levied 
under the Public Roads Toll Act.24 It further introduced efficacy in the 
                                                 
17  The GoK had initiated various programmes which included; Rural Access Roads Programme (RARP); 
Minor Roads Improvement and Maintenance Programme (MRP); Kenya Market Development Programme 
(KMDP). 
18  Wasike, WSK (2001) (n3). 
19  Public Roads Toll Act (Cap 407) Laws of Kenya. 
20  Long title of Public Roads Toll Act. 
21  Section 7 Public Roads Toll Act. 
22  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act No. 9 of 1993. 
23  Long title to  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act No. 9 of 1993. 
24  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act No. 9 of 1993, sec 7(2). 
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collection of moneys for road repairs and maintenance. Unlike the public 
roads toll, which was collected on the road by government agents,25 and 
provided opportunity for corruption, the levy is collected by the 
petroleum fuel marketers who are registered as remitters in accordance 
with the Act.26
 
However, the public roads toll and the road maintenance levy funds both 
lacked institutional backing at inception, since they were held and 
managed under the Ministry concerned with roads. The Department for 
Roads under the Ministry is one of the road agencies concerned with 
national roads. However, the petroleum fuel levy applied to all classes of 
roads, and it should have been applied to the maintenance of all roads in 
the country. Such anomalies were cured by the creation of the KRB27 
which inter alia, was mandated to manage the Kenya Roads Board 
Fund.28 The Act provides:29
 
There shall be paid into the Fund - 
a) all proceeds from the Road Maintenance Levy Fund; 
b) such moneys or assets as may accrue to or vest in the Board in the 
course of the exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions 
under this Act or under any other written law;  
c) such sums as may be payable to the Board pursuant to this Act or 
any other written law, or pursuant to any gift or trust; 
d) all moneys from any other source provided for or donated or lent to 
the Board. 
 
                                                 
25  Public Roads Toll Act sec 4: ‘The Minister shall appoint toll collectors who shall collect tolls at toll 
stations and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Minister for the purpose of this Act’. 
26  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act sec 4. 
27  IEA (n8). 
28  Kenya Roads Board Act sec 31, creation of the fund. 
29  Kenya Roads Board Act sec 31(2). 
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The Act also provides for an allocation criteria for the distribution of the 
proceeds of the RMLF among all the concerned road agencies, as shown 
in the KRB’s accounts (see annex one). KRB allocates funds to road 
agencies for the maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the 
categories of roads in respect of which they are designated.30 This 
institutional framework consolidates the funding aspects of the road 
network, and facilitates consultation between KRB and the road 
agencies, as provided for under section 19 of the Act.31 This section 
states: 
 
1. The Board shall indicate to the road agencies at least a year in advance 
– 
a) the amount of money likely to be available to the Board for 
allocation in the coming year; 
b) the priorities of the Board in funds allocation in the coming year; 
and 
c) the criteria to be applied in making allocations. 
2. Every road agency shall, at least six months before the commencement 
of every financial year, submit to the Board an annual roads 
programme in such form and containing such details as the Board shall 
specify, outlining a comprehensive plan of action for the development 
rehabilitation and maintenance of roads under the charge of the roads 
agency and the estimated costs of every activity required to implement 
the plan of action. 
3. The road agency shall select the roads to be included in its programme. 
4. The Board shall review, individually, the annual roads programmes 
submitted to it by the road agencies and shall consolidate the annual 
roads programme into annual public roads programme which shall: 
a) specify the amounts allocated for the maintenance, 
rehabilitation and development of each class of roads; 
                                                 
30  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 20. 
31  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 19. 
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b) match the cost of implementing the annual roads programme 
with revenues collected or estimated to be collected by and 
within the Fund; and 
c) identify roads requiring maintenance, rehabilitation or 
development in order of priority, taking into account social and 
economic requirements of the country or any part thereof in 
which roads are located. 
5. The Board shall submit to the Minister and the Minister for Finance the 
annual roads programme for approval and the approved programme 
shall form the basis of funds allocation and auditing of works by the 
Board and shall not be varied by the road agency without the prior 
written approval of the Board. 
 
The KRB presents a good working institutional framework for the 
financing strategy for which the study opts, viz where there is one 
institution that is responsible for the financing of all initiatives for the 
development, maintenance and rehabilitation of the road network.  
4.4.0. Innovative Financing 
Kenya had the first sovereign credit rating done by Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) in 2006.32 Though it was praised as a strong credit rating for a 
first time assessment, the rating of B+ for long-term foreign currency, 
BB- for long-term local currency, and B for short-term foreign and local 
currency sovereign credit ratings33 are not sufficiently impressive to 
access the international capital markets at competitive spreads. Ketka 
and Ratha argue that investment grade debt should be rated BBB and 
above to attract investors.34
 
                                                 
32  ‘Kenya given strong global credit rating’, Saturday Nation, September 09, 2006   
33  Ibid. 
34  S Ketka & D Ratha, Development financing during a crisis: securitization of future receivables, (2001)  
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This section discusses issuing of debt instruments collateralised by 
future receivables to allow the borrower to obtain a credit rating that is 
superior to that of the sovereign (and thus allows a reduction in 
financing costs). Securitization using future earnings also monetises the 
future earnings, and is used as a source of capital in the current period. 
We envisage a model based on the RMLF which is managed by the KRB 
as a component of the Kenya Road’s Board Fund.35 KRB is the statutory 
body that is entitled to receive and manage all the funds in RMLF36
Legal framework with regard to the RMLF 
The Kenyan RMLF was established by the Road Maintenance Levy 
Fund Act, Act No. 9 of 1993.37 The Act also provides that the RMLF shall 
consist of the proceeds from the petroleum fuels levy and the transit tolls 
levied under the Public Roads Toll Act.38 All monies accruing to the 
RMLF shall be paid into a special account established by the KRB.39 The 
Kenya Roads Board Act provide for the management of the fund as part 
of the Kenya Roads Board Fund.40
 
The collection and remittance of the RMLF funds is administered under 
the Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act and the Public Roads Toll Act. For 
petroleum fuels levy, the remitting party, a petroleum fuel marketer, 
registers with the Chief Engineer in the MoR&PW, who is the collector,41 
while payment is made to the revenue authority through the 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise.42 For transit tolls, revenue 
                                                 
35  Established under sec 31 of the KRB Act; supra note 28. 
36  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 31(2)(a). 
37  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 7. 
38  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 7(2). 
39  Kenya Roads Board Act Sec 7(3). 
40  IEA (n8). 
41  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act Sec 4 (2). 
42  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act third schedule. 
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authority staff are positioned at the border points, and such tolls are 
colleted there. 
 
The study asserts that, though the levy is a tax, it can be distinguished 
from a general tax, since it is appropriated for the purposes of 
maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the road network.43 A 
general tax is appropriated for whatever use by the government through 
the annual budget of financial estimates presented to the national 
assembly. This distinction is very important with regard to two things: 
 
I. The rating of the transaction by the rating agencies if KRB decides 
to issue debt guaranteed/ secured by the future flows to the RMLF. 
That is, the funds collected by the revenue authority on behalf of 
RMLF cannot be diverted to any use by the government other than 
the one specified by the law. 
 
II. For the purposes of getting a waiver from the IBRD’s and other 
development banks’ negative pledge clause44 (see annex 2). If KRB 
issued debt collateralised by the future receivables of the RMLF, 
then it would mean that such debt would be given priority over the 
IBRD and other development banks’ loans to the government; this 
would violate the negative pledge clause in the IBRD’s and other 
development banks’ loan agreements. However, if it is shown that 
the funds in the RMLF usually are appropriated for maintenance, 
rehabilitation and development of the road network, and not to 
settle the government’s external debt, and therefore do not prejudice 
the country’s position to meet its other debt obligations, then a 
waiver may be granted.      
                                                 
43  Kenya Roads Board Act  Sec 39 (4). 
44  IBRD General Conditions for Loans Dated July 1, 2005 (as amended through October 15, 2006) 
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4.4.1. Securitisation45of Public Debt with Future Receivables 
Securitisation means an arrangement which involves the transfer of 
assets or risk: (i) to a bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) (ii) 
by way of an insolvency proof sale, where such transfer is funded by the 
issuance of debt securities to investors, and payments to investors in 
respect of such debt securities are principally derived, directly or 
indirectly, from the cash-flows of the assets.46 It could also be 
understood as an  assignment, where the assignor transfers to the 
assignee all or part of, or an undivided interest in, the assignor’s 
contractual right to payment of a monetary sum ‘receivable’ from a third 
person.47 The assets in this case are the future receivables due to the 
originator; for public debt, the originator may be the government or a 
public body. Future receipts that have been securitised in the past 
include: (1) crude oil and other mineral receivables, (2) airline ticket, 
telephone, credit card, or electronic remittances receivables, (3) other 
export receivables, and (4) government revenues.48
 
This study also provides a diagram in Figure 4.1 of a general model used 
for securitisation of future receipts for raising foreign currency 
denominated debt. The originator sells its rights and interests in future 
receivables for an upfront price to the offshore entity, the SPV that 
finances its purchase by issuing debt securities whose servicing is 
collateralised by the receivables. To ensure that future receipts are good 
collateral, the originator provides irrevocable instructions to foreign 
importers that purchase its exports, requiring them to make payments to 
                                                 
45  Securitised borrowing can also be referred to as ‘asset-backed’ or ‘collateralised’. 
46  See definition by Kenya Capital Markets (Asset Backed Securities) Regulations, 2006. Regulation 3(1). 
47  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Receivables Financing, Analytical 
Commentary on the Draft Convention on Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (2001). 
48  See S Ketka & D Ratha, (n34). 
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an escrow account controlled by the arrangement’s trustee.49 The trustee 
pays for debt service to the investors (principal and interest), and the 
monies that remain are paid back to the originator through the SPV 
(obligor). 
 
Figure 4.1: Structure of a Typical Collateralised Future Receipts 
Arrangement 50
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49  IMF Assessing Public sector borrowing collateralized on future flow receivables (2002). 
50  C Nigel,  The Potential Role for Securitizing Public Sector Revenue Flows: An Application to the Philippines, 
IMF Working Paper No. 02/106 (2002). 
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The model also helps in the enhancement of the credit rating of the 
transaction. The general structure of a secured financing arrangement 
(as outlined in Figure 4.1) is designed specifically to mitigate the various 
risks through:51
 
I. Ensuring that foreign currency flows needed to service the debt are 
always outside of the originator's local jurisdiction in order to 
eliminate transfer and convertibility risk (and thus allow the issuer 
to pierce the sovereign ceiling); 
II. Backing the securitisation with sales to obligors that are 
investment-grade and based in industrial countries to reduce 
obligor risk; 
III. Establishing the SPV in an offshore, tax-neutral jurisdiction that is 
outside the tax jurisdiction of the originator's home government, in 
order to eliminate tax risk; and 
IV. Ensuring that the future flow receivables and the debt service 
obligations are denominated in the same foreign currency, and thus 
to remove any exchange risk. 
 
However, the situation of Kenya is somewhat different from the one 
envisaged in the general model presented by the IMF52, C Nigel53 and S 
Ketka & D Ratha54 since there is no sale of goods as envisaged. The 
receivable which is a tax is generated in Kenya and is collected in Kenyan 
shillings (local currency).  
                                                 
51  See, IMF (n49). 
52  Ibid. 
53  See C Nigel (n 50). 
54  See S Ketka & D Ratha, (n34). 
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4.4.2. KRB’s RMFL Future Receivables Securitisation 
In this section this study will illustrate, using Figure 4.2, a possible 
financing model for KRB using future receivables from RMFL funds. This 
section will also identify the various risks in the model and how they can 
be mitigated. 
Future Tax Receivables 
Future tax receivables (government revenue) in the opinion of Ketka and 
Ratha55 are the most risky future revenue to secure an investment grade 
debt.56 Though their opinion holds water, this study will show that the 
structuring of the legal framework has much to do with the risk 
perception where government revenue is involved. 
 
Ketka and Ratha based their conclusions on the risk connotation on the 
government revenues from debt issued by the Argentinean Provinces 
backed by future receivables from the federal tax coparticipation 
payments.57 Though the co-participation payments are sufficiently 
protected under the law, and there is an assurance that the federal 
government will meet its obligation to the provinces to distribute a 
certain percentage of the co-participation revenue to them; the co-
participation payments are not entirely appropriated for a specific 
purpose. On the other hand, the RMFL is entirely appropriated to the 
maintenance, rehabilitation and development of roads, in fact, the Act 
envisage a situation where, if there is a surplus, the KRB may invest the 
surplus in government securities or place them in an interest bearing 
account.58 Therefore the government cannot divert monies collected by 
                                                 
55  See S Ketka & D Ratha, (n34). 
56  See, IMF (n49). 
57  Federal tax coparticipation in Argentina refers to a situation where most taxes are collected by the 
federal government, which then redistributes the revenue to the provinces. 
58  KRB Act Sec 33. 
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means of the RMFL or any other components of the KRB Fund, to any 
other use other than the one intended by the Act.  
Figure 4.2: securitisation of future fuel levy receivable in foreign 
currency 
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However, the perception of risk with regard to the political commitment 
of the government to respect the legal structure of the KRB to enter into 
collateralised financing using future receivables, is reliant on the 
government’s respect for the rule of law, and maintenance of strict 
budgetary controls. With regard to the rule of law, the government must, 
without delay, pass on the monies collected/ remitted to the Central 
Bank into an account operated by the KRB as provided for by the Act,59 
or into an account held in trust (as illustrated in Figure 4.2). As far as 
budgetary controls are concerned, the government must always maintain 
the strict fiscal discipline that would not allow it to infringe on the 
revenue meant for the KRB, particularly because of the ease with which 
the funds are generated and collected.  
 
The dealings between the Central Bank and the offshore escrow account 
may also have some risks associated to it. This may include:  
Performance Risk   
This concerns questions such as whether the originator of the debt is 
capable of generating cash flows to service the secured debt, or is legally 
barred from issuing secured debt by virtue of negative pledge clauses in 
respect of other debts. The rating agencies when rating the transaction, 
would look at: the ability of the legal framework to assign future cash 
flow to the SPV; effects of bankruptcy, reorganisation, or insolvency upon 
future cash flow; and the ability of the originator to generate the cash 
flow. 
 
The government may give a counter guarantee for the payment of the 
RMFL funds to an escrow account established outside its jurisdiction. 
Similarly, a third party guarantee, such as from the World Bank, AfDB or 
                                                 
59  Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act Section 7(4).  
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other financial institution, may be sought, to enhance prompt payment 
by the government. 
 
With regard to negative pledge clauses usually contained in loan 
agreements: disallowing the government to incur further debt, or 
ensuring that no other external debt shall have priority over the prior 
debt in the allocation, realisation and distribution of foreign exchange 
held under the control of the borrower or for its benefit (Annex 2). The 
government may seek a waiver from the application of the clause if it is 
able to show that the funds in the RMLF are appropriated for 
maintenance, rehabilitation and development of the road network, and 
not to settle the government’s external debt, and therefore do not 
prejudice the country’s position to meet its other debt obligations. 
 
The ability to pay is primarily determined by how the RMLF funds are 
collected. According to the financial statement for the 2001/2002 
financial year60 the KRB raised around Kshs 8.2 billion; in financial year 
2003/2004 the KRB raised Kshs 9.05 billion;61 and, finally, in financial 
year 2005/2006 the KRB raised Kshs 15 billion.62This indication of 
growth in collection is encouraging and presents a good indication for the 
future flow growth. The steady growth, and the possibility of continued 
growth in the future, would present a positive appeal for the debt 
instruments issued on the strength of the RMLF’s receivables. 
Exchange Rate Risk 
The exchange rate risk would concern questions like: are there currency 
mismatches between the receivable inflows and the debt service 
outflows? In this case the future flows are denominated in local currency; 
                                                 
60  Annex 1. 
61  Road Maintenance Levy Fund (RMLF) Interim Report year 2003/204. available on http://www.krb.go.ke 
(accessed on 27/04/2007). 
62  ‘Sh2.1bn for constituency roads’, Daily Nation, October 19, 2006. 
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therefore, rating may reflect this risk by capping the transaction rating to 
the sovereign rating. However, a government undertaking to bear the 
exchange risk, by matching the deposits made to the escrow account and 
the currency of debt service, would substantially reduce the exchange 
risk. Adoption of good exchange rate policies, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
would also help alleviate this risk. MIGA insurance would also come in 
handy to assure the investor that the government is committed to ensure 
an open exchange rate policy. 
Transfer and Convertibility Risk  
Here the question is: what is the risk that a government, faced with a 
balance of payments crisis, will impose restrictions that limit foreign 
currency debt repayments by domestic borrowers, or have recourse to 
measures to limit net outflows of foreign currency? Such risks include 
the imposition of exchange controls, multiple exchange rate practices, 
the freezing of bank accounts, and foreign exchange surrender 
requirements. If the ratings agency can establish that the borrower will 
not be hampered in accessing foreign currency and transferring it to 
investors outside the country, then the agency will consider rating the 
issue above the sovereign ceiling. MIGA insurance would also be very 
useful in ensuring that the government honours the agreement to pay 
the investors in foreign currency (see Chapter 3, Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Insurance). Similarly, a country’s balance of 
payments would be enhanced if it had a robust export industry which 
would receive a strong boost from developed infrastructure. 
 
The exchange rate risk, and the transfer and convertibility risk may be 
substantially reduced by issuing the securities in the domestic market. 
This would also contribute to the development of the domestic markets, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Collateralised future receivable borrowing has its flip side as well, which 
includes: 
Reducing future fiscal flexibility63
Assigning a future stream of revenue to service collateralised debt 
amounts to an earmarking operation and reduces future fiscal flexibility.  
By limiting the resources under the control of the budget, earmarking 
constrains the budget’s ability to adjust to changing priorities and 
circumstances. In the model presented of collateralised borrowing, a 
particular concern (in addition to the problem of an inflexible debt 
service schedule) is that the related escrow accounts can lock in cash 
that would otherwise be available to the government. These idle cash 
balances represent an inefficient use of resources because they could be 
used for other purposes, for example, reducing short-term borrowing 
costs. The government could find itself in the position of building up 
cash balances in the SPV, while simultaneously borrowing at high 
interest rates or running arrears. Further, the government ability to alter 
the amount of the fuel levy (e.g. to reduce the amount paid as fuel levy by 
the consumers of petroleum products) is constrained since it is used as 
collateral.  
4.5.0. Conclusions 
RMLF is used as the model that Kenya would easily be able to improve 
on to increase on the funding for the maintenance rehabilitation and 
development of the country’s infrastructure. The Kenyan RMLF was 
chosen because Kenya is a country in the sub-Saharan Africa region and 
experiences the same problems that many other sub-Saharan Africa 
countries do.  
 
                                                 
63  IMF (49). 
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Though Kenya is able to raise money for road maintenance, 
rehabilitation and development through a tax on petroleum fuels and 
transit tolls from transit traffic, the money has often been too little to 
provide for the huge demand. The Chapter highlights the need for 
securitisation to monetise future receivables for current expenditure on 
infrastructure.   
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-5- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study started by showing the importance of transport infrastructure 
in trade facilitation development, and as a means of attracting FDI.  It 
went further to concur with the argument put forward by the World 
Bank:1 that overall cost of trade is not all about quotas and other trade 
policies, but also customs procedures, trade distorting impact of 
standards, and transport costs (own emphasis). The World Bank’s study 
is specifically important in its assertion that improving custom 
procedures, minimizing trade distorting standards and reducing 
transport costs (own emphasis) may have a higher payoff because 
logistical, institutional and regulatory barriers are often costly and 
generate no offsetting revenue.2 This study is hinged on the argument 
that good transport infrastructure substantially reduces the cost of doing 
business and increases the competitiveness of a country’s products, and 
the country as a destination for FDI (see Chapter 1).3
 
However, the study would also want to dispel the notion that transport 
infrastructure is the sole factor that propels development, facilitates the 
inward flow of FDI, and reduces in the cost of doing business in a 
country. Though the study underscores transport infrastructure as an 
underlying factor in development, we would like to assert that investment 
in transport infrastructure: 
                                                 
1  World Bank, Global economic prospects: Trade regionalism and development, (2005). 
2  See World Bank (n1) p 37. 
3  See also D Grimsey, & MK Lewis, Public private partnerships: The worldwide revolution in infrastructure 
provision and project finance (2004) p 25. “… recent studies confirm a significant positive relationship 
between productivity and infrastructure and suggest that infrastructure may be a key determinant of 
comparative advantage between countries.”  
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I. Would only generate relocation of industries and economic activities 
in the long run. This occurs when firms decide to relocate because 
of change in accessibility brought about by transport infrastructure 
investment. However, relocation in the short run could be actuated 
by a significant change in transport cost, if the change is material.4 
II. Is not a continuous process and the investment is determined by 
specific needs. Therefore, at certain stages of economic development 
transport infrastructure may be a constraint on growth, but, once 
the constraint is dealt with, further investment does little to expand 
productive capacity.5    
 
This study also makes an observation that the main problem with the 
maintenance and development of infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa is 
a lack of funds. The International Ministerial Conference on Transit 
Transport Cooperation6 also highlighted the lack of funds as the major 
impediment of the developing countries’ infrastructure matching that of 
the developed countries. Therefore, the study not only interrogated the 
benefits of infrastructure, but, also how legal and institutional 
frameworks determine access to capital for these countries to develop 
their infrastructure. 
 
Chapter 2 looked at the various sources of capital that are available to 
developing countries. It was noted that many developing countries, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, rely on official development 
assistance (ODA), thereby exposing themselves to policy and priority 
changes by donor countries. Similarly, concessional funds from the 
International Development Association (IDA) are exposed to the 
                                                 
4  See D Grimsey, & MK Lewis (n3) p 26. 
5  Ibid. 
6  International Ministerial Conference on Transit Transport Cooperation, Roundtable on Trade Facilitation 
Measures Almaty, Kazakhstan, (2003). 
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developed countries’ policies and priorities, since the developed 
countries’ contribution to IDA’s replenishment comprises over 50 per 
cent of the IDA kitty.7
 
On the other hand many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region are 
not eligible to borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) because they do not meet the threshold for 
borrowing from it by virtue of their lack of creditworthiness, and since 
their gross national income (GNI) per capita is less than that required to 
borrow from the IBRD. Similarly, their participation in commercial banks 
lending and international capital markets is characterised by short 
maturities and high interest rates.  
 
In its conclusion Chapter 2 makes suggestions for developing a 
government bond market and a secondary market for government bonds. 
It is envisaged that a government bond market, if it is well managed, 
would: 
VIII. Provide funding for government’s budgetary deficits; 
IX. Reduce need for foreign currency financing which is potentially 
damaging, and avoid build-ups of foreign currency denominated 
debts; 
X. Strengthen the transmission and implementation of monetary 
policy, including the monetary targets or inflation objectives, 
through the open market operation (OMO); 
XI. Coupled with prudent debt management, could help governments 
reduce their exposure to interest rate, currency and other financial 
risks; 
                                                 
7  Donors who are mostly the wealthy members of IDA, contribute most of the funds, e.g. donor 
contributions accounted for more than half of the US$33 billion in the IDA14 replenishment.  See 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Updaterecentdevelopments.pdf (accessed on 
28/03/2007). 
 98
XII. In the long term it would reduce the debt service cost, if based on 
market forces;  
XIII. Help change the financial system from a primary bank-oriented to a 
multilayered system, where capital markets can complement bank 
financing – also creating competition for banks, and therefore the 
introduction of new products at competitive prices; 
XIV. Support the development of bond markets for the sub-national and 
corporate sectors. The relatively risk free assets provided by 
government bonds establish a reference for pricing sub-national and 
corporate bonds, commercial papers or any kind of private sector 
fixed income securities.  
 
However, the sub-Saharan African countries must establish a proper 
regulatory legal framework and a market infrastructure that favours 
development of a government bonds market. In this regard, the 
government must be able and willing to protect and enforce property 
rights, encourage wider participation in the market through appropriate 
reform programs, licensing, regulations and supervision, and further 
broaden and diversify the investor base by opening the market to foreign 
investors. 
 
Chapter 3 looked at how a government can encourage wider participation 
of the private sector in infrastructure development and maintenance 
through public private partnership (PPP). In that chapter it was observed 
that private capital is risk sensitive, particularly with regard to 
infrastructure projects, which have long build-out and pay-back periods. 
The study appreciates that risk can not be completely eliminated; 
therefore the objective should be, to share risk between the government 
and the private entities to achieve value for money by the government.  
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In achieving value for money the government must ensure that the risk 
transferred to the private entity is not optimal, but appropriate in a way 
that the best placed party to bear the risk should bear the risk at 
minimum cost. The chapter also proposes other methods which could be 
used to mitigate some of the risks which cannot be well priced by the 
market. These include: government guarantees, multilateral development 
bank guarantees, and the multilateral investment guarantee agency 
(MIGA) insurance. 
 
The benefits flowing from proper risk allocation and mitigation by way of 
guarantees and insurance would include: 
IV. By covering risk that the market cannot assume, the guarantee/ 
insurance can facilitate access to financing that would not otherwise 
be available for certain projects, thus making them possible. 
V. The guarantees/ insurance can extend the maturity of loans for a 
longer loan period that would otherwise not be possible without the 
guarantee, thereby allowing for a lower unit cost of output over the 
life of the project. 
VI. The guarantees/ insurance provide borrowers (public and private) 
with greater flexibility in choosing the most appropriate financing 
sources (currencies, markets, interest rates benchmarks etc.) for 
their needs. 
 
Similarly, the private sector is very wary of disputes, particularly if the 
disputes are not likely to be fairly determined or the system is so 
inefficient as to cause unwarranted delay. The study looked at corruption 
as one of the hindrances in sub-Saharan Africa to fair adjudication of 
disputes, and inefficiencies in the court process. It further proposed 
alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration, in which 
parties have more faith. In this regard, countries in the sub-Saharan 
Africa region would need to enact laws that govern recognition and 
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enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate, and the recognition and 
enforcement of the awards of the arbitral tribunal. For wider recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
should assent to international conventions, such as the New York 
Convention and the ICSID Convention. 
 
Chapter 4 looked at innovative ways that could be used in financing road 
transport infrastructure, using the Kenyan Road Maintenance Levy Fund 
(RMLF) as the model.  The Kenyan RMLF was chosen because Kenya is a 
country in the sub-Saharan Africa region and experiences the same 
problems that many other sub-Saharan Africa countries do. Though 
Kenya is able to raise money for road maintenance, rehabilitation and 
development through a tax on petroleum fuels and transit tolls from 
transit traffic, the money has often been too little to provide for the huge 
demand. The Chapter highlights the need for securitisation to monetise 
future receivables for current expenditure on infrastructure.   
 
Overall the study’s objective is to establish a relationship between legal 
and institutional frameworks in a country, and the competitiveness of 
that country as a destination for investment, either as real investment or 
portfolio investment, for infrastructure development. When investors feel 
secure because of the protection provided by the law, and that the rule of 
law would prevail, they tend to: 
I. Invest, because they have confidence in the particular market; 
II. Invest for a longer period, thereby prolonging the maturities in the 
loans and bonds, thus allowing for a lower unit cost of output in a 
project over the life of the borrowing; and  
III. Lower the risk premium, and therefore the cost of capital goes 
down. 
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Therefore, the sub-Saharan Africa governments should concentrate on 
improving or establishing the legal framework and institutions that 
would enhance investor confidence. Protecting investors is one of the 
very basic requirements that is a prerequisite to attracting investment. 
Protection should not only be in the statute books, but also in practice, 
thereby making the fight against corruption and other systemic 
inefficiencies a priority.   
 
Institutions that favour the development of a government bond market 
should also be established where they do not exist and where they do 
they should be strengthened. Autonomy in regulation of the secondary 
market by the securities regulation commission/ authority is necessary 
to assure the investors that the government does not influence prices on 
its bonds. Secondary market infrastructure should also be efficient to 
enhance price discovery and settlement. When all these factors are 
combined, they produce a liquid market and attract investors. 
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